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Abstract
We consider a multiproduct seller facing consumers who must search to learn
prices and valuations. The equilibrium features choice overload: the larger the
product line, the fewer consumers start searching. We provide conditions under
which the seller offers too much or too little variety. We then allow the seller to
position products or make recommendations, thereby introducing the possibility of
directed search, and show that the seller may find it profitable to maintain some
noise. Finally, we study the seller’s incentive to disclose product identity and extend
our analysis to that of a platform choosing which sellers to host.
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1 Introduction
In today’s internet age, consumers face a choice among a huge variety of products. How-
ever, finding out which product a consumer likes best (and what final price he has to
pay) has become a complicated and time-consuming task. Such frictions are at the heart
of the literature on consumer search, which has recently undergone a resurgence due to
the increasing importance of internet platforms and e-commerce. Experimental evidence
also points to adverse reactions by consumers to an increase in product range, a phenom-
enon dubbed choice overload. For example, Iyengar and Lepper (2000) document that
an increase in the number of flavors sold at a jam tasting booth in an upscale grocery
store induced a significant reduction in the share of customers making a purchase.
In this paper, we develop a sequential search model that is consistent with the choice
overload phenomenon, and use it to study the optimal product offering of a monopolistic
seller. An increase in product variety has two opposing effects. On the one hand, it in-
duces fewer consumers to search in the first place, thus being consistent with choice over-
load. On the other, it induces a higher probability of a sale for each consumer who chooses
to search. Depending on the distribution of search costs in the population of consumers,
the seller’s optimal product variety may be socially excessive or insuffi cient. Eliminating
choice overload through product positioning or search recommendations (thereby making
consumer search more effi cient) may, however, not be in the interest of the seller. Instead,
even when such possibility is available, the most profitable equilibrium often involves a
stochastic strategy by the seller, so as to ensure that active consumers keep searching
until finding a match.
In the model, described in Section 2, there is a set of heterogeneous products that differ
in their “popularity”, i.e., the probability with which any consumer has a “match”with
that product. Consumers differ in their match-conditional valuations for products as well
as in their search costs. A firm decides which subset of the products to offer and how to
price them. Consumers only observe the size of the product line but not the identity of the
offered products nor their prices. Upon inspecting a product, a consumer learns whether
he has a match with that product and, if so, his match-conditional valuation, which is the
same across products. He uses this information to update his beliefs about the not-yet-
inspected products. In the baseline setting, products are allocated to indistinguishable
“slots”so that (sequential) consumer search is necessarily random.
In Section 3 we show that, for any given size of the product line, the firm chooses
the most popular products and offers them at monopoly prices. Consumers with low
enough search costs start searching and continue to do so until finding a match (and
then either purchase or give up, depending on the realization of their match-conditional
valuation). This is because, consumers who did not find a match in previous inspections
become increasingly optimistic about finding a match at the next one. Consumer search
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therefore has the potential to be “addictive:” some consumers unwilling to start searching
would, if coerced to make a first inspection, voluntarily keep searching afterwards– others
(those with higher search costs) would need to experience more than one inspection before
becoming “addicted”to searching.1
An increase in the size of the product line has two opposing effects: On the one hand,
it offers more opportunities of finding a match; on the other, by reducing the average
popularity among the products on offer, it lowers the probability of finding a match on
any given inspection. We show that the latter effect always dominates, implying that
the number of consumers who choose to search is decreasing in the size of the product
line– consistent with the choice overload phenomenon. However, increasing the size of
the product line does benefit consumers with suffi ciently low search costs as it increases
the probability of finding a match.
The seller’s optimal size of the product line is socially excessive (resp., insuffi cient) if,
on average, the search cost of infra-marginal consumers increases more (resp., less) than
proportionally with the search cost of the marginal consumer.2 We also show that the
seller’s optimal size of the product line is decreasing in the elasticity of the search cost
distribution, and that it increases (resp., decreases) with consumers’share of the surplus
if that elasticity is decreasing (resp., increasing).
In Section 4, we assume that the firm can put products in specific positions (e.,g,
because there are distinguishable slots or, alternatively, because the firm can make rec-
ommendations about the products), which allows for the possibility of directed search.
We first show that the previous outcome can still be sustained by a uniformly random po-
sitioning policy: this not only leaves consumers indifferent about their search sequences,
but also induces them to keep searching until finding a match– which in turn makes the
firm indifferent about positioning.
We then study “positioning” equilibria in which consumer search is directed. [For
simplicity, we assume in that part of the analysis that the maximum size of the product
line is two.] In particular, we show that there exists a “pure positioning” equilibrium
in which the slot allocation or the recommendation policy is deterministic; it is thus
perfectly informative, implying that consumers inspect the products in decreasing order
of popularity. In this equilibrium, more consumers start searching because they will
inspect the most popular product first. However, some consumers then stop searching
after the first inspection– even absent finding a match; as a result, this equilibrium may
be less profitable than the random positioning equilibrium.
In addition, there exists a continuum of “noisy positioning”equilibria in which the
1There is a large literature in psychology and marketing on shopping addiction and compulsive buying
disorder (oniomania), first described by Kraepelin (1915, p.409).
2The seller’s optimal size of the product line is socially optimal if the search cost of infra-marginal
consumers increases at the same rate as that of the marginal consumer– i.e., if search costs are distributed
according to a power law.
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slot allocation or the recommendation policy are non-uniformly random, which induces
consumers to start with the more promising position (i.e., where they are more likely
to encounter the more popular product). In all of these equilibria, consumers who start
searching continue to do so until they find a match (and in the best such equilibrium,
consumers who are indifferent between starting or not, are also indifferent between con-
tinuing or not). For these equilibria to exist, however, the positioning policy has to be
suffi ciently noisy.
Finally, we allow for the possibility that the firm discloses the identity of a product
upon inspection. This prevents the positioning policy from being perfectly informative.
By contrast, the noisy positioning equilibria are robust to such disclosure possibility.
In Section 5, we show that the main insights carry over to the case of a monopolistic
platform hosting a set of third-party (single-product) sellers. We conclude in Section 6.
Related literature. Our paper is related to several literatures. First, it contributes
to the burgeoning literature on consumer search. In the classic Wolinsky (1986) model
of sequential search with differentiated products, and the literature that builds upon it,
consumers sequentially search for the best “match”. Each firm offers a single product,
and products are completely symmetric in that a consumer gets a random draw of his
valuation for the product from the same distribution. Our paper contributes to that
literature in several ways. Most importantly, we introduce product heterogeneity in
an analytically tractable way by assuming that products differ in their “popularity”
(i.e., the probability with which a consumers likes a product) while maintaining the
assumption of consumer heterogeneity.3 Second, we analyze pricing and product choice
of a multiproduct monopolist. The existing literature on consumer search mostly focuses
on (competing) single-product firms, and the few papers that do consider multiproduct
firms (e.g., Zhou, 2014; Rhodes, Watanabe, and Zhou, 2019) typically assume that, upon
visiting a multiproduct firm, a consumer automatically learns his match values (and
prices) for all of the products offered by that firm (i.e., there is no within-firm search).4
In the second part of our paper, where positioning becomes available, we show that
the firm may be worse off when consumer search is directed (in which case consumers
first inspect the most promising positions). This is related to some recent papers on
consumer obfuscation and search diversion. Petrikaité (2018) studies a Wolinsky-type
model of sequential search where a monopolist sells two (symmetric) products and chooses
3In contrast to Wolinsky (1986), consumers not only differ in their valuations for a given product but
also in their search costs. Moraga-Gonzalez, Sandor and Wildenbeest (2017) introduce heterogeneous
search costs in a version of the Wolinsky (1986) model with an infinite number of firms.
4One exception is Rhodes (2015) who studies the pricing and advertising decisions of a multiproduct
retailer offering n symmetric products. Contributing to the literature on price (rather than match) search
with homogeneous goods, pioneered by Stahl (1989), Hämäläinen (2019) allows not only for inter-firm
search but also for intra-firm search.
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not only prices but also product-specific search costs.5 Consumers observe these search
costs and then decide which product to inspect first; that is, search is directed. In
equilibrium, the seller does obfuscate exactly one product (i.e., sets a positive search
cost for that product). By contrast, in our model, product-level search costs are fixed
(and identical) but products are heterogeneous, and we compare profits across equilibria
(with and without directed search). Hagiu and Jullien (2011) analyze search diversion
by a monopolistic intermediary. There are two independent sellers on the platform and
the intermediary receives an exogenous seller-specific fee for making a consumer visit a
seller. The intermediary observes consumers’types and ex ante commits to seller-specific
diversion probabilities (i.e., probabilities with which a consumer has to visit first the less
preferred seller). Hagiu and Jullien show that, if prices are exogenous, the intermediary
diverts consumers with positive probability toward the firm from which it receives the
higher fee.6 ,7 By contrast, in our model, the firm is vertically integrated (except in Section
5), does not observe consumers’types, and cannot force consumers to inspect products in
a particular order. The second part of our paper is also related to Chen and He (2011),
who study consumer search and advertising on an internet platform. In their model,
single-product firms that differ in the popularity of their products participate in auctions
for distinguishable advertising slots. They show that there exists a separating equilibrium
(akin to our pure positioning equilibrium), in which the firm offering the most popular
product wins the auction for the advertising slot that consumers visit first, as well as a
pooling equilibrium (akin to our random positioning equilibrium), in which firms bid zero
and search is random.8
Choice overload– the phenomenon that consumers may be less likely to choose a
product if they face more options– has been well-documented in several field experiments.
As mentioned above, Iyengar and Leppar (2000) find that consumers are less likely to
make a choice if they are offered a larger number of jam flavors. Boatwright and Nunes
(2001) report an experiment run by an online grocery: in the experimental group in
which the product selection was halved, the sales were 11 percent higher than in the
control group. Kamenica (2006) has shown that choice overload can be rationalized if
consumers make contextual inferences from the number of products on offer. In his model,
a firm can choose to offer any subset of N possible flavors of jam (at some exogenous
price). Each consumer likes at most one flavor, with flavors differing in the fraction
of consumers who like them. There are both informed consumers (who know which
5Gamp (2019) analyzes a setup that is, in some ways, more general than Petrikaité (2018)’s but
assumes that prices are observable.
6If prices are endogenous, then some consumer types are diverted even if the intermediary receives
the same fee from both sellers.
7Teh and Wright (forthcoming) study steering of consumers by a monopoly intermediary on a platform
where firms pay commission fees to influence the intermediary’s ranking of products.
8Eliaz and Spiegler (2011) study the pricing of a monopoly platform in a variant of the Che and He
(2011) model.
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flavor they like) and uniformed consumers (who do not). Informed consumers therefore
pick their favorite flavor if it is on offer (and do not choose anything otherwise) whereas
uninformed consumers have to randomly pick one flavor, if any. The existence of informed
consumers implies that, for a given number of flavors, the firm offers the most popular
ones. Offering a larger number of flavors involves a trade-off: on the one hand, more
informed consumers are buying (as a larger choice set is more likely to include the favorite
flavor); on the other, it makes uninformed consumers less likely to purchase (as they are
less likely to find their favorite flavor, given that they have to randomly pick one). By
contrast, in our model, all consumers are equally uninformed ex ante but can engage in
(costly) sequential search to find a product they like; that is, we endogenize the extent
of information that consumers have, and compare random and directed search equilibria.
Kuksov and Villas-Boas (2010) also offer a (random) consumer search model to explain
choice overload. However, in their model the optimal consumer search rule is quite
complicated, which leads them to focus on the case of three or fewer alternatives. The
tractability of our model allows us to consider instead arbitrary product ranges, to study
pricing and product choice decisions, and to compare random and directed search.
2 Setting
Consider an industry in which there is a countably infinite number of products, indexed
by i = 1, 2, .... On the supply side, a monopolist chooses (i) which subset I of these
products to offer, and (ii) the prices (pi)i∈I at which it offers them.9 There is no fixed
cost associated with offering a product, and all products involve the same constant unit
cost of production, normalized to zero.
On the demand side, a unit mass of consumers have unit demands, and differ in their
search costs and valuations. The search cost, c, has a continuous c.d.f. G(·) over the
support R+, satisfying G(0) = 0. Consumers value a product only if they have a match
with that product, and these matches are independent across consumers and products.
As in Chen and He (2011), each product i is characterized by the probability µi ∈ (0, 1)
with which any consumer has a match with that product. We assume that µi > µi+1
and limi→∞ µi = 0; that is, products are labeled in descending order of popularity and
there is a finite number of products meeting any given level of popularity. Conditional
on having a match, a consumer’s valuation, v, is distributed over [0,∞) with c.d.f. F (·).
Consumers’match-conditional valuations are i.i.d. across consumers but, conditional on
a match, a consumer’s valuation is the same for all products.
Consumer search is random and sequential: consumers first learn their search costs
9Throughout the paper, we assume that the price charged by the monopolist for product i, pi, is
the same for all consumers. In particular, the monopolist cannot condition the price on the consumer’s
search history or other consumer characteristics.
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and observe the number of products offered by the firm (but not their identity), and
decide whether to start searching or not. If a consumer chooses not to search, his payoff
is zero. If he chooses to search, he pays the search cost c and randomly inspects one of
the products. Upon inspection, he observes the price of the product and learns whether
or not he has a match with that product; if he does, he learns his match-conditional
valuation v. He then decides whether or not to purchase the product; if he does, he stops
searching. Otherwise, he decides whether to inspect another product, thereby incurring
again the search cost c, and so on. Importantly, consumers never learn the identity of
inspected products; instead, they update their beliefs on the basis of products’prices,
whether or not they had a match and, if so, their match-conditional valuations.
The timing is as follows:
Stage 1 The firm chooses the size n of its product line, which is observed by consumers.
Stage 2 The firm chooses the composition of its product portfolio (i.e., it chooses I
subject to |I| = n) and sets its prices, none of which is observed by consumers.
Stage 3 Consumers sequentially choose whether to inspect (randomly) the offered prod-
ucts.
We will characterize the (pure-strategy) Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBE) of this
game. For any size of the product line chosen in stage 1, stages 2 and 3 form a proper
subgame of incomplete information. Hence, the continuation equilibrium strategies of
the firm (product selection and pricing decisions) and of the consumers (search and
purchasing decisions) must constitute a PBE of the subgame. In this subgame, consumers
never observe the composition of the product portfolio but, upon inspection, observe the
prices charged by the firm, whether there is a match, and moreover learn their valuation
upon the first match. As long as they observe prices that are consistent with the firm’s
equilibrium strategy,10 consumers update their beliefs according to Bayes’ rule, using
all relevant information. In particular, the occurrence of a match is informative of the
popularity of the inspected product. The observed prices may also be informative when
equilibrium prices differ across products. By contrast, as a consumer’s match valuation is
the same for all products, the realization of this valuation does not add any information
to that conveyed by the sequence of matches.
When instead consumers observe unexpected prices, Bayes’rule has no bite. However,
it is usual to restrict attention to off-equilibrium beliefs that are consistent beliefs, that is,
based on relevant information;11 in our setting, this rules out beliefs that would depend on
search costs and realized valuations. Still, when encountering an out-of-equilibrium price
10As 0 < µi < 1 for every product i, any observed match sequence is consistent with any strategy of
the firm.
11See Kreps and Wilson (1982).
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in a given subgame, consumers may wonder about the implications of this unexpected
deviation in the firm’s strategy for the not-yet-inspected products and prices. Common
assumptions include passive12 and wary13 beliefs: in our setting, the former means that,
when encountering one or more out-of-equilibrium prices during their search process,
consumers stick to the belief that the firm has chosen the subgame equilibrium product
portfolio and set the subgame equilibrium prices for all the not-yet-inspected products;
the latter means instead that consumers expect the firm to have chosen the optimal
product portfolio and prices, given the observed out-of-equilibrium price(s).
For tractability, we will use passive beliefs for our baseline analysis. However, when
possible we will further focus on equilibria that are robust to alternative (consistent)
beliefs:
Definition 1 A PBE is belief-proof if it remains a PBE when replacing consumers’off-
equilibrium beliefs and behavior14 with any other consistent off-equilibrium beliefs and any
off-equilibrium behavior induced by these beliefs.
In other words, an equilibrium is belief-proof if it remains an equilibrium, no matter
how consumers interpret unexpected deviations, as long as consumers do not react dif-
ferently based on their search costs or their realized valuations. By construction, the set
of belief-proof equilibrium outcomes is a subset of passive-belief equilibrium outcomes.




(v − p)dF (v)
denote the expected profit and consumer surplus, respectively, generated by a match with
a product priced at p. We assume that π(p) has a unique maximizer, denoted pm, and
let πm ≡ π(pm) and sm ≡ s(pm).
3 Equilibrium Analysis
We first show in Section 3.1 that, for any size of the product line chosen in stage 1, there
exists a belief-proof continuation equilibrium, in which the firm offers the most popular
products at the monopoly price, and any consumer who starts searching keeps doing so
until finding a match. We also show that this equilibrium maximizes the profit expected
from any active consumer (i.e., any consumer who start inspecting the products) and
constitutes the unique belief-proof continuation equilibrium. We note in in Section 3.2
12See, e.g., Hart and Tirole (1990) and O’Brien and Shaffer (1992).
13See, e.g., McAfee and Schwartz (1994).
14That is, purchasing and search decisions subsequent to encountering an unexpected price.
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that this equilibrium exhibits “choice overload”: an increase in the size of the product line
reduces the number of consumers who start searching. We then derive the implications of
choice overload for the equilibrium product variety: we provide in Section 3.3 conditions
under which the variety offered is socially excessive or insuffi cient, and analyze in Section
3.4 some of its determinants.
3.1 Pricing and Product Selection
Throughout this section, we fix the size n of the product portfolio chosen by the firm and
study the continuation subgame. It is instructive to begin with the case where the firm
chose to offer a single product, i.e., n = 1. Consider a candidate continuation equilibrium
in which the firm offers product i at price pi. A consumer with search cost c thus inspects
the product if and only if c ≤ µis(pi). Suppose now that the firm deviates by offering
product j at price pj. As consumers cannot observe this deviation before inspecting the
product, it does not affect their search behavior, and consumers then buy if they have a
match with a valuation exceeding pj; the profit resulting from this deviation is therefore
G (µis(pi))µjπ(pj),
where G (µis(pi)) > 0 as consumers with suffi ciently small search costs find it optimal to
inspect the product. This expression is maximized by setting j = 1 and pj = pm. Hence,
in the unique equilibrium of this subgame, the firm selects the most popular product,
I = {1}, and charges the monopoly price pm.15 Consumers with search costs c ≤ µ1sm
inspect the product (and purchase it if they have a match with valuation v ≥ pm), whereas
those with higher search costs do not. The firm’s equilibrium profit in subgame n = 1 is
thus equal to G (µ1s
m)µ1π
m.
We now show that the logic extends to any larger product line n ≥ 2. Consider
first a candidate equilibrium in which the firm offers the product portfolio I (such that
|I| = n) and prices are uninformative: all products are offered at the same price (or price
lottery). Let αk(I) denote the probability of a match at the kth inspection, conditional
on not having had any match at the previous k − 1 inspections, we have:
Lemma 1 (increasing optimism) For any product portfolio I of size n ≥ 2, if prices
are uninformative, then αk(I) is strictly increasing in k ∈ {1, ..., n}; as a result, any
consumer who starts searching keeps searching until finding a match.
Proof. See Appendix A.
15The equilibrium would not necessarily be unique if we had assumed that consumers’search costs are
bounded away from zero: in that case, there may be a “coordination failure”equilibrium in which the
firm offers a very unpopular product and no consumer engages in search.
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As prices are uninformative, consumers update their beliefs only on the basis of their
match sequences. That αk(I) increases with k then follows from the fact that, when an
inspected product does not yield a match, consumers put a higher probability on that
product being one of the less popular products, and therefore become more optimistic
about finding a match at the next inspection. This, in turn, encourages consumers to
keep searching until finding a match.
Remark 1 (search addiction) That consumers become more optimistic in the absence
of a match gives rise to a search addiction pattern: consumers who do not want to start
searching may choose to keep searching if coerced to do a first search, the result of which
turns out to be unsuccessful.
It follows from Lemma 1 that a consumer who starts searching finds a match with
probability
M (I) ≡ 1−
∏
i∈I
(1− µi) . (1)
The next lemma shows further that, to maximize the expected per-consumer profit, the
firm cannot do better than charging the monopoly price:
Lemma 2 (monopoly profit) Fix the size n of the product line. In the continuation
subgame, for any given (consistent) consumer beliefs and any optimal search strategy
given these beliefs (off as well as on the equilibrium path), the firm cannot obtain an
expected per-consumer profit greater than M (In) πm.
Proof. See Appendix B.
By construction, by offering any given product portfolio I at any given constant
price p, the firm cannot obtain an expected per-consumer profit greater thanM (I) π (p),
which is maximal for I = In and p = pm. Lemma 2 shows further that the firm cannot
gain from charging different prices across products: although this could enable the firm
to discriminate among consumers according to their (costs and) valuations, consumers’
self-selection actually works against the interest of the firm, as it is precisely the con-
sumers with higher valuations that are more prone to keep searching, and thus likely
to find lower prices. To see this, consider the subgame n = 2, a candidate continua-
tion equilibrium in which the firm offers products i and j at prices pi and pj < pi, and
consider those consumers who learn their valuations on the first inspection. Obviously,
consumers who first inspect the lower-priced product, j, stop searching. For those who
inspect product i first, the expected benefit of inspecting the other product is equal to
−c + µj [max {v − pj, 0} −max {v − pi, 0}], which is weakly increasing in v, and strictly
so if v ∈ (pi, pj). As a result consumers with higher valuations are more likely to find the
lower price pj.
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It follows from Lemma 2 that offering the most popular products at the monopoly price
does constitute a belief-proof continuation equilibrium: deviating from this candidate
equilibrium cannot affect the number of consumers who start searching, and can only
decrease the profit generated by them, regardless of how consumers revise their beliefs
when encountering unexpected prices. Conversely, this constitutes the unique belief-
proof continuation equilibrium: if consumers’beliefs are “optimistic”, in that they induce
consumers to keep searching when encountering unexpected prices, then, starting from
any other candidate equilibrium, the firm could obtain (arbitrarily close to) M (In) πm
by offering the most popular products at deviating prices arbitrarily close to pm. It
also follows from Lemma 1 that, in this equilibrium, consumers are indifferent between















is the expected number of inspections until the first match, with
S(I) ≡ {(i1, ..., i|I|) ∈ I |i1 6= ... 6= in}
denoting the set of sequences of products in I. Building on these observations leads to:
Proposition 1 (portfolio composition and prices) Fix the size n of the product line;
in the continuation subgame, there exists a PBE with passive beliefs in which:
(i) the firm offers the most popular products at the monopoly price: I = In and pi = pm
for every i ∈ In;
(ii) consumers keep searching until finding a match if their search costs is lower than
cn, and do not search otherwise; upon finding a match, consumers stop searching,
and purchase the product if their valuation exceeds the monopoly price.
Furthermore, this PBE is belief-proof and its outcome is the unique belief-proof PBE
outcome.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Remark 2 (observability of product portfolio) In our setting, where consumers only
observe the size n of the product line (but not its composition), offering the most popular
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products (i.e., I = In) maximizes the probability of a match, M(I), but does not affect
the number of searchers, G(cn). If we had assumed, instead, that consumers observe the
composition of the product line as well, then offering the most popular products would
also maximize the number of searchers.16 It follows that Proposition 1 would carry over
to the case where consumers observe I before deciding to engage in search.
Remark 3 (equilibria with passive beliefs) Given the portfolio size n, Proposition
1 characterizes a PBE with passive beliefs which is also the unique belief-proof PBE of
the continuation game. It is easy to see that there is no other PBE with passive beliefs
and uniform pricing: with passive beliefs, a deviation from a uniform equilibrium price
p 6= pm to pm would have no impact on consumers’search behavior (from Lemma 1, active
consumers keep searching until finding a match), but would increase the expected profit
generated by a match. However, there exist equilibria with passive beliefs in which the firm
does not charge the monopoly price on some products, and a deviation to the monopoly
price would reduce the likelihood that consumers keep searching. In Online Appendix A,
we provide an example of such an equilibrium, in which the firm offers products 1 and
2 at prices p1 = pm and p2 < pm, and consumers who first encounter product 1 stop
searching even in the absence of a match. From Proposition 1, this equilibrium is not
belief-proof (indeed, the firm would deviate from p2 to p̃2 ' pm if this deviation were to
induce consumers to keep searching in the absence of a match) but can be more profitable
than the monopoly pricing equilibrium, by encouraging more consumers to start searching:
as consumers do not inspect product 2 if they encounter product 1 first, they are more
prone to do a first inspection.
3.2 Choice Overload
We now examine how the size of the product line affects consumers’search behavior and
welfare, assuming that the above unique belief-proof continuation equilibrium arises for
any size n of the product line. We first note that expanding the product line increases the
expected number of searches needed to find a match, as it reduces the average popularity
of the selected products, but increases the overall probability of a match:
Lemma 3 (match probability and search intensity) Expanding the product line in-
creases both the overall match probability and the expected number of searches needed to
find a match: M(In) and N(In) are strictly increasing in n.
Proof. See Appendix D.
16In both cases, the argument developed in the proof of Proposition 1 can be used to show that the
firm has no incentive to deviate from monopoly pricing when deviating on the composition of its product
portfolio. Hence, the profit from such a deviation to I is given by G(cn)M(I)πm when only n is observed,
and by G(M(I)sm/N(I))M(I)πm when I is observed; in both cases, this profit is maximal for I = In.
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The following proposition shows that, despite this trade-off, expanding the product
line reduces the number of consumers who search —to the point that consumer demand
would vanish if the firm were to offer all products:
Proposition 2 (choice overload) Expanding the product line reduces the number of
consumers who search: (i) cn is strictly decreasing in n, and (ii) limn→∞ cn = 0.
Proof. Part (i). The expected surplus of a consumer with search cost c when facing














where the first two terms correspond to the expected surplus from the first inspection,
and each term in curly brackets corresponds to the expected surplus from subsequent
searches, conditional on the first product having been inspected being product i.
As ∂S(c;n)/∂c < 0, the marginal type cn is uniquely determined by S(cn;n) = 0 and,






























where the last equality follows from the definition of cn. To conclude the proof, it suffi ces
to note that, on the RHS of (4): (a) the sum of the first two terms is strictly negative;
and (b) each term in curly brackets is strictly negative as well.
To see (a), recall first that (
∑n
i=1 µi)/n is strictly decreasing in n, implying that∑n+1
i=1 µi
n+ 1





Furthermore, cn is such that
[α1(In)sm − cn] + [1−α1(In)][α2(In)sm− cn] + ...+ Πn−1i=1 [1−αi(In)][αn(In)sm− cn] = 0,
where αk(In) is the probability of a match at the kth inspection, conditional on no prior
match and, from Lemma 1, is strictly increasing in k. Hence, the first term (in brackets)
on the LHS of the last equation is non-positive (otherwise, the sum of the terms would





Finally, (b) follows from the definition of cn, in conjunction with the observation that,
for any i ≤ n, M(In+1\{i}) < M(In) and N(In+1\{i}) > N(In): this can be seen from
(1) and (3), using µi > µn+1.
Part (ii). See Appendix E.
Proposition 2 shows that increasing the size of the product line from n to n + 1
reduces the number of consumers who search. It implies that consumers with search costs
cn+1 < c < cn suffer from the expansion of the product line: for them, the benefit from
the increased probability of a match is outweighed by the increased expected number
of searches needed to find a first match. In contrast, consumers with suffi ciently low
search costs benefit on net as they are hurt less by the increase in the expected number
of searches.
Building on these observations leads to:
Corollary 1 (impact of product line on consumers) For any n ∈ N∗, there exists
ĉn ∈ (0, cn+1) such that increasing the size of the product line from n to n + 1 does
not affect consumers with search costs c ≥ cn (as they do not search anyway) but hurts
consumers with search costs c ∈ (ĉn, cn), while benefiting consumers with search costs
c < ĉn.
Proof. Consider an increase in the size of the product line from n to n + 1. From
Proposition 2, consumers with search costs exceeding cn do not search under either sce-
nario and are therefore unaffected, whereas those with search costs between cn+1 and
cn no longer search and are therefore worse off (by a standard revealed preference argu-
ment). For consumers with a search cost lower than cn+1, the impact of the product line
expansion can be expressed as:
[M(In+1)−M(In)]sm − [N(In+1)−N(In)]c,








are better off, whereas those with c > ĉn are worse off.
3.3 Product Variety
We now turn to the firm’s decision about the size of its product line. If all products had
the same match probability µ > 0, then the search cost threshold would be independent of
n (and given by cn = µs
m), and the firm would therefore wish to offer as many products as
possible. However, under our more plausible assumption that the popularity of additional
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products tend to vanish as the firm expands its product line, the choice overload effect
identified in Proposition 2 implies that the firm chooses to limit the size of its product
line, even in the absence of any fixed cost of introducing products:
Proposition 3 (limited product line) There exists an equilibrium. In equilibrium,
the firm offers a finite number of products: I∗ = {1, 2, ..., n∗}, where 1 ≤ n∗ <∞.
Proof. We have already shown that there exists a unique belief-proof continuation
equilibrium for any size n of the product line. By assumption, G(c) > 0 for any c > 0.
This implies that, for any size n of the firm’s product line, there is a strictly positive
mass, G(cn), of consumers who search, generating a strictly positive level of profit, given
by
Πn ≡ G (cn)M (In)πm. (5)
However, this profit tends to vanish as n goes to infinity as it is bounded by G (cn) π
m,
where, from Proposition 2 and the continuity of G at 0, limn→∞G(cn) = 0. Hence, there
exists n̄ such that Πn < Π1 for any n > n̄, and in equilibrium the firm never offers
more than n̄ products. Conversely, for any n∗ ∈ arg maxn∈{1,...,n̄} {Πn}, there exists an
equilibrium in which the firm offers n∗ products.
To analyze whether the firm will provide too much or too little product variety from
consumers’or society’s point of view, note that consumer surplus, as a function of the








[cn − c] dG(c)




cdG(c)/G(cn) is the average search cost of those consumers who
search in equilibrium. Let nS ≡ arg maxn Sn and nW ≡ arg maxnWn denote the size of
the product line that maximizes consumer surplus and social welfare, respectively, where
Wn ≡ Πn+Sn denotes social welfare when the firm offers n products. The same argument
as in the proof of Proposition 3 implies that both nS and nW are finite.17
We have:
Proposition 4 (private vs. social provision of product variety) If the average cost
of inframarginal consumers, ce (c), is proportional to the cost of the marginal consumer,
17For the sake of exposition, we assume here that nS , nW and n∗ are all unique; in (non-generic) cases of
multiple optima, Proposition 4 applies to every solution in arg maxn Sn, arg maxnWn and arg maxnWn.
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c, then the equilibrium size of the product line maximizes consumer surplus and social
welfare.
If instead ce (c) increases less (resp., more) than proportionally with c, then the firm
tends to offer more (resp., fewer) products than what would maximize consumer surplus
or social welfare: n∗ ≥ nS, nW (resp., n∗ ≤ nS, nW ).
Proof. When the firm offers n products, its profit is given by (5) which, using





From (6), consumer surplus can be written as
Sn = [1− ρ (cn)]N (In) cnG (cn) ,
where




It follows that if ce (cn) is proportional to cn (that is, if ρ (·) is constant), then Sn, Πn
and Wn are all maximal for n∗ = arg maxnN (In) cnG(cn).
More generally, using a revealed preference argument, we have:
SnS = [1− ρ (cnS)]N (InS) cnSG (cnS)
≥ Sn∗ = [1− ρ (cn∗)]N (In∗) cn∗G (cn∗)
≥ [1− ρ (cn∗)]N (InS) cnSG (cnS) ,
where the last inequality follows from Πn∗ ≥ ΠnS , and thus
ρ (cn∗) ≥ ρ (cnS) . (7)
From (7), it follows that if ρ (·) is decreasing, then cnS ≥ cn∗. To show that this
implies nS ≤ n∗, suppose otherwise that nS > n∗. From Lemma 3, we would have








If instead ρ (·) is increasing, then, from (7), cnS ≤ cn∗. To show that this implies
nS ≥ n∗, suppose otherwise that nS < n∗. Noting that, integrating by parts, consumer
surplus can be expressed as
Sn = N (In)
∫ cn
0













G(c) = Sn∗ ,
a contradiction.























which in turn implies
ρ (cnW ) ≤ ρ (cn∗) .
The same reasoning as above then shows that nW ≤ n∗ (resp., nW ≥ n∗) if ρ (·) is
decreasing (resp., increasing).
We show in Online Appendix B that the average inframarginal cost ce(c) is propor-
tional to c if and only if search costs are distributed according to a power law, that is,
c is distributed over [0, c] according to G (c) = (c/c)α for some α > 0 —this holds, for
instance, when the distribution is uniform: G(c) = c/c. If instead the density of search
costs is of the form g (c) = 1 +α (c− 1/2), where |α| ≤ 2, then ce(c) increases less (resp.,
more) than proportionally with c if α > 0 (resp., α < 0).
The intuition underlying Proposition 4 is reminiscent of Spence’s (1975) price versus
quality trade-off. In Spence’s analysis, the cost of increasing quality is borne by the firm
and is thus the same from the private and social standpoints, whereas the private and
social benefits of such an increase may differ: the firm focuses on the impact of quality
on marginal consumers, as this is what drives demand, whereas consumer surplus and
social welfare account for the impact of quality on infra-marginal consumers as well. In
our model, expanding the product line increases the probability of a match, M (In),
which affects the firm and consumers in the same way, but it also increases the expected
number of inspections, N (In), which may affect differently marginal and infra-marginal
consumers. This explains why the firm tends to provide too much (resp., too little)
product variety if the average search cost of the inframarginal consumers increases less
(resp., more) than proportionally with the search cost of the marginal consumer.18
18Because n is necessarily an integer, however, the firm may provide the socially optimal product
variety even when its incentives are biased.
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3.4 Comparative Statics
We provide here some insights on the determinants of the size of the product line. We
start with a brief discussion of the impact of relative popularity of the products, before
relating the optimal size of the product line to key elasticities.
To study the impact of relative popularity of the products, we focus on the choice
between one versus two products:
Lemma 4 (impact of relative product popularity) Suppose that there are two prod-
ucts available, of popularity µ1 and µ2 respectively, and that the cost distribution has a con-
tinuous density g(·) satisfying g (0) > 0. There exists a continuous function η̂ (µ1) ∈ [0, 1],
satisfying η̂ (0) ' 0.585 and η̂ (1) = 0, such that it is optimal for the firm to offer both
products if and only if
µ2 > [1− η̂ (µ1)]µ1.
Proof. See Online Appendix C.
As is intuitive, it is optimal to introduce a second product if it is suffi ciently popular.
Interestingly, the acceptable (percentage) reduction of popularity, η̂ (µ1), is lower when
the first product is already popular. In particular, if the first product is highly popular
(i.e., µ1 close to 1), the second product must be almost as popular to be added (i.e.,
η̂ (µ1) is close to 1). This can be contrasted with what we might expect when the size of
the product line is driven by cost considerations. For example, if adding another product
involves a fixed cost, we would expect narrower product lines when products are not too
popular. By contrast, when the size is driven by choice overload concerns, the optimal
size of the product line may be greater if both products are not too popular than if they
are both popular. For example, assuming that the percentage reduction (µ1 − µ2) /µ1
remains constant and lower than η̄, n = 2 dominates n = 1 when µ1 (and thus µ2) is
close to 0, whereas the opposite holds when µ1 (and thus µ2) is close to 1.
We now revert to arbitrary sets of available products and relate the optimal size of the
product line to key elasticities. For the sake of exposition, we ignore integer constraints
and, further, assume here that the private and social optima are uniquely defined; this,
in turn, enables us to rely on the first-order approach.19 We have:
19Recall from Proposition 2 that the privately optimal number of products, n∗, is an interior solu-
tion; the same applies to nS and nW . Furthermore, note that if the firm’s profit were to achieve its
maximum for multiple sizes of the product line, almost any small perturbation would break the firm’s
indifference and yield uniqueness. Hence, the comparative statics provided by the following propositions
hold generically for small changes in the parameters of interest.
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Lemma 5 (optimality condition for product variety) Ignoring integer constraints,
the first-order condition characterizing the equilibrium size of the product line, n∗, can be
expressed as
εM (n





















respectively denote the elasticities of M (In) and M (In) /N (In).20
Proof. The firm’s equilibrium profit as a function of n can be expressed as




























Hence, evaluated at n∗, the term in brackets (which is equal to the elasticity of the firm’s
profit with respect to the size of its product line) is equal to zero, yielding (8).
Condition (8) has a simple interpretation: Expanding the product line by one percent
increases the probability of a match by εM percent, but decreases the marginal consumer’s
inspection cost threshold by εM/N percent, translating into a εGεM/N percent decrease in
the population of consumers who search.
Building on this insight, allows us to provide comparative statics. The following
proposition shows that the equilibrium size of the product line is independent of πm and,
depending on the search cost distribution, can either increase or decrease with sm:
Proposition 5 (division of surplus) The equilibrium size of the product line, n∗, is
independent of πm. By contrast, ignoring integer constraints, n∗ strictly increases (resp.,
strictly decreases) with sm if
dεG
dc
(cn∗) < 0 (resp., > 0).
20By construction, εG (c) and εM (n) are both positive, for any c and n; furthermore, from Proposition
2, cn is decreasing in n and thus εM/N (n) > 0.
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Proof. From the proof of Lemma 5, the elasticity of the firm’s profit with respect to












As n∗ is the profit-maximizing number of products (which we assume to be unique), it
follows that ϕ(n; sm) is strictly decreasing in n at n = n∗. Furthermore,
∂ϕ
∂sm





and is thus strictly positive (resp., strictly negative) if dεG(cn∗)/dc < 0 (resp., dεG(cn∗)/dc >
0). The assertion follows from the implicit function theorem.
The next proposition shows that the equilibrium product line shrinks when the dis-
tribution of search costs becomes more elastic:
Proposition 6 (elasticity of search cost distribution) Suppose that the search cost
distribution can be indexed in such a way that its elasticity, εG(·), strictly increases with
some parameter γ. Then, ignoring integer constraints, n∗ decreases with γ.
Proof. Following the same steps as in the proof of Proposition 5, it suffi ces to note






= ϕ(n; γ) ≡ εM(n)− εG(cn; γ)εM/N(n).
The assertion then follows from the assumption that εG(·; γ) strictly increases with γ.
4 Positioning and Disclosure
So far, we have assumed that, prior to inspection, consumers could not distinguish prod-
ucts, neither directly nor indirectly; as a result, search is necessarily random. In some
environments, however, a “positioning technology”may be available and potentially allow
for directed search. For example, supermarkets place their products in “distinguishable
slots”such as aisles and shelves and online platforms can make recommendations. In this
section, we therefore extend our baseline setting by assuming that the firm can use such
a technology to position its offerings.
We first show that a “no-positioning”equilibrium still exists, in which the firm adopts
a completely random positioning policy (e.g., it randomly allocates products to slots, or
makes completely uninformative recommendations); consumers are thus indifferent about
the search sequence, and the outcome is as characterized by Proposition 1. Next, we
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show that there also exist “positioning”equilibria, in which consumer search is perfectly
directed. We characterize these equilibria for the two-product case. One such equilibrium
exhibits “pure positioning”: the firm adopts a deterministic positioning policy, which is
therefore perfectly informative; as a result, consumers inspect the more popular product
first, but some of them then stop searching even in the absence of a match. Other
equilibria rely instead on “noisy”positioning: the firm adopts a positioning policy which
is random but not uniformly so; this suffi ces to direct consumer search, as consumers
inspect first the more promising position, but maintains enough uncertainty to induce
all active consumers to keep searching until finding a match. These equilibria are Pareto
ranked: they only differ in the probability of placing the more popular product in the
first position, which determines the informativeness of the positioning policy; the best
equilibrium (for consumers as well as for the firm) is the most informative one, in which,
in the absence of a match, consumers are indifferent between continuing searching or not.
For the sake of exposition, we assume that, for any size n of the product line, the firm
places the products in n distinguishable positions, j = 1, ..., n, in such a way that there
is one position per product, and one product per position. The timing becomes:
Stage 1 The firm publicly chooses the size n of its product line, which now also deter-
mines the number of positions.
Stage 2 The firm now privately chooses not only its product portfolio and its prices, but
also the positioning of the n selected products among the n positions.
Stage 3 Consumers sequentially decide which positions to inspect.
We extend the notion of passive beliefs by assuming that, when encountering one or
more out-of-equilibrium prices, consumers not only stick to the belief that the firm has
chosen the equilibrium product portfolio and the equilibrium prices for the products in
the not-yet-inspected positions but they also maintain the belief that the firm has chosen
the equilibrium positioning policy:
4.1 Random positioning
Our first result shows that the “no-positioning” equilibrium characterized in Proposi-
tion 1 can still be sustained by completely randomizing over the slot allocation or the
recommendations.
Proposition 7 (random positioning - portfolio composition and prices) Fix the
size n of the a product line; in the continuation subgame, there exist infinitely many Per-
fect Bayesian Equilibria with passive beliefs in which:
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(i) the firm offers the most popular products at the monopoly price: I = In and pi = pm
for every i ∈ In;
(ii) the firm randomizes uniformly over its positioning policy;
(iii) consumers start searching if and only if their search cost is lower than cn, in which
case they keep searching until finding a match; upon finding a match, consumers
stop searching and purchase the product if their valuation exceeds the monopoly
price.
These equilibria all give the firm the same expected profit, equal to
Πn = G (cn)M (In)πm.
They only differ in the order in which consumers inspect the positions: any (determinis-
tic or random) distribution of search sequences for each of the active consumers can be
supported in equilibrium.
Proof. The proof follows closely that of Proposition 1. To see that the firm has no
incentive to deviate from the random positioning policy, note first that such a deviation
would not be observed by consumers; hence, it would not affect consumer participation.
Second, note that all active consumers keep searching until finding a match. As a re-
sult, the firm is indifferent about its positioning policy. Conversely, given that the firm
uniformly randomizes over its positioning policy, consumers are indifferent as to the or-
der in which they inspect the positions —even if they were to observe out-of-equilibrium
prices, due to passive beliefs. Hence, any arbitrary search sequence can be supported in
equilibrium, and different consumers can pick different sequences.
This equilibrium corresponds to the case in which the firm adopts a completely un-
informative positioning policy; for example, it uniformly randomizes over the assignment
of products to slots, or the order in which it recommends consumers to inspect prod-
ucts. In equilibrium, consumers are then indifferent as to whether or not to follow the
recommendations (and may or may not do so).
If this continuation equilibrium is played for every size of the product line, then the
overall equilibrium is the same as that characterized by Proposition 3:
Corollary 2 (random positioning - product line) There exists an equilibrium in which
the firm chooses a product line of size n∗ ∈ arg maxn Πn, and offers products in I =
{1, 2, ..., n∗} at the monopoly price, and randomizes uniformly over its positioning policy.
The insights from our previous analysis still apply to that equilibrium. However, as
shown below, there now also exist equilibria featuring some positioning.
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4.2 Positioning
We now turn our attention to equilibria in which the firm adopts an informative posi-
tioning policy. For the sake of exposition, throughout the rest of this section we assume
that the firm can at most offer two products: n ∈ {1, 2}.
Obviously, positioning is a moot issue if the firm chooses to offer a single product. In
that case, there is a unique continuation equilibrium, in which the firm offers the most
popular product at the monopoly price (i.e., p1 = pm) and consumers inspect the product
if their search cost is lower than c1, in which case they buy if they have a match with a
valuation exceeding pm; the resulting profit is thus Π1 = G (c1)µ1π
m.
We now study the subgame when the firm chooses to offer two products. For the sake
of exposition, we focus on equilibria in which the firm still charges monopoly prices; it
readily follows that it selects the two most popular products (that is, I = {1, 2})21 and
that, upon finding a match, consumers stop searching (and then purchase the product if
their valuation exceeds the monopoly price).
We first note that positioning induces a directed search behavior:
Lemma 6 (directed search) Fix the size of the product line to n = 2, and consider
a continuation equilibrium in which the firm offers the two most popular products at
monopoly prices: I = {1, 2} and p1 = p2 = pm; unless the firm randomizes uniformly
over its positioning policy, active consumers inspect first the position that is more likely
to correspond to the more popular product.
Proof. See Appendix F.
The intuition is simple: in any equilibrium with informative positioning, in the sense
that the firm is more likely to place the more popular product in a given position, con-
sumers prefer to inspect that position first, as this increases the probability of a match
if they stop searching afterwards, and otherwise decreases the probability of having to
incur the cost of a second inspection. In what follows, whenever an equilibrium exhibits
directed search, we refer to first inspected position as the “first position”and to the other
one as the “second position”.
21Starting from a candidate equilibrium in which the firm selects product j > 2 rather than product
i ∈ {1, 2}, replacing j with i would increase its expected profit. This is obvious for those consumers who
then inspect product i on a second inspection: they would do so only if they did not have a match on
the first inspection, and increasing the probability of a match on that second inspection would therefore
benefit both the firm and consumers. But this is also the case for consumers who inspect product i on
a first inspection, as the expected profit conditional on a match is then πm, and is lower in the absence




The next proposition characterizes the (essentially unique) equilibrium featuring “pure
positioning”, that is, in which the positioning policy is deterministic and thus perfectly
informative:
Proposition 8 (pure positioning) Suppose that the firm has chosen to offer two prod-
ucts: n = 2; in the continuation subgame, there exists a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
with passive beliefs in which:
(i) the firm offers the most popular products at the monopoly price: I = {1, 2} and
p1 = p2 = p
m;
(ii) the firm places product 1 in first position, and product 2 in second position;
(iii) consumers start searching if and only if their search cost is lower than c1 = µ1s
m, in
which case they start with the first position and, in the absence of a match, inspect
the second position if and only if their search cost is lower than µ2s
m.
The firm’s expected profit is equal to
ΠP ≡ G (µ1sm)µ1πm +G (µ2sm) (1− µ1)µ2πm.
Finally, there is no other equilibrium with passive beliefs, monopoly pricing and a
deterministic positioning policy.
Proof. See Appendix G.
A deterministic (and, thus, perfectly informative) positioning policy encourages more
consumers to start searching, as they expect to find the most popular product on their
first inspection. However, fewer consumers keep searching in the absence of a match:
without positioning, all consumers with a cost lower than c2 not only start searching, but
keep doing so until finding a match. By contrast, with positioning, only those with a cost
lower than µ2s
m (< c2) are willing to make a second inspection.
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If the positioning equilibrium is played when the firm chooses to offer both products,
expanding the product line does not discourage consumers from searching: expecting to
find the most popular product on their first inspection, all consumers with search cost
c < c1 = µ1s
m inspect it, as is the case when the firm chooses to offer only that product. It
22To see that c2 > µ2s
m, note that:
c2 − µ2sm =
[





(2− µ2) (µ1 − µ2)
4− µ2 − µ1
sm > 0.
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follows that expanding the product line is always profitable, as some consumers (namely,
those with cost c < µ2s
m) inspect the second product as well:
Corollary 3 (pure positioning - product line) Suppose that the firm can offer at
most two products; there exists an equilibrium in which the firm offers the two most
popular products at the monopoly price, and adopts a pure positioning policy.
Interestingly, despite inducing more consumers to start searching, positioning may
decrease the profitability of the firm, as it discourages a fraction of them from making a
second inspection. Indeed, the firm is better off in the random positioning equilibrium
whenever Π2 ≥ ΠP ,23 which amounts to
G (c2) >
µ1G (µ1s
m) + (1− µ1)µ2G (µ2sm)




µ1 + µ2 − µ1µ2
2− µ1+µ2
2
sm ∈ (µ2sm, µ1sm).
Holding µ1 and µ2 fixed, this condition holds if the distribution of search costs is such
that G(µ1s
m)−G(c2) is small relative to G(c2)−G(µ2sm). By contrast, the positioning
equilibrium is more profitable for instance when, holding the distribution G (·) of search
costs fixed, µ2 is suffi ciently small (close to zero) or suffi ciently large (close to µ1);
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is actually the case for any µ2 < µ1 when G is uniform.
4.2.2 Noisy positioning
The equilibria characterized by Propositions 7 and 8 feature two alternative, arguably
extreme ways of resolving the trade-off between encouraging more consumers to partici-
pate (the extensive margin) on the one hand, and fostering the search intensity of these
consumers (the intensive margin) on the other: the pure positioning equilibrium maxi-
mizes consumer participation, whereas the random positioning equilibrium ensures that
all participating consumers keep searching until finding a match. Potentially, there is a
variety of intermediate solutions, in which the more popular product is more likely to
be placed in first position (thus inducing consumers to start with that position, and also
encouraging more of them to do so), but is also placed in second position with some prob-
ability (so as to encourage consumers to keep searching). The next proposition shows
that among these intermediate solutions, those that maximize search intensity, and only
those, can indeed be supported in equilibrium:
23Positioning is irrelevant when it chooses to offer a single product, and the positioning equilibrium is
more profitable when the firm chooses to offer two products than one; hence, ΠP > Π1.
24As µ2 → 0, the LHS converges to G(µ1sm/(2 − µ1/2)), whereas the RHS converges to G(µ1sm) >
G(µ1s
m/(2− µ1/2)). As µ2 → µ1, the LHS converges to the RHS from below.
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Proposition 9 (noisy positioning) Suppose that the firm has chosen to offer two prod-
ucts: n = 2. There exists an r̄ < 1, which is decreasing in µ2 and increases from 1/2 to 1
as µ1 increases from µ2 to 1, such that, for any r ∈ [1/2, r̄], in the continuation subgame
there exists a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium with passive beliefs in which:
(i) the firm offers the most popular products at the monopoly price: I = {1, 2} and
p1 = p2 = p
m;
(ii) with probability r, the firm places product 1 in first position and product 2 in second
position; with complementary probability 1− r, it does the reverse;
(iii) consumers start searching if and only if their search cost is lower than some thresh-
old cN2 (r), in which case they start with the first position and keep searching in the
absence of a match; their total probability of having a match is therefore maximal
and equal to:
M2 ≡ µ1 + µ2 − µ1µ2.
These equilibria differ in the probability r of placing the more popular product in first
position; the firm’s expected profit, given by






coincides with that obtained in the random positioning equilibrium for r = 1/2, and
increases with r.
Finally, together with the equilibria characterized by Propositions 7 and 8, these equi-
libria are the only ones with passive beliefs and monopoly pricing.
Proof. See Appendix H.
This proposition shows that there is no equilibrium with noisy positioning in which a
consumer stops searching when a first inspection did not produce a match. The intuition
is as follows. On the one hand, positioning, that is, placing the more popular product
(i.e., product 1) with greater probability in first position, induces all active consumers
to start with that position. On the other hand, to be willing to maintain some noise,
the firm must be indifferent about which product to place in which position. But if all
active consumers start with the first position and some of them stop searching after that,
even if they do not have a match, then the firm strictly prefers to place product 1 in
first position, a contradiction. Hence, to sustain noisy positioning, all active consumers
must keep searching in the absence of a match; this, in turn, imposes an upper bound
on the probability r that product 1 is placed in first position —this upper bound is such
that consumers who are indifferent between inspecting or not the first position are also
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indifferent between inspecting or not the second one if they do not obtain a match on the
first inspection.
The limit case r = 1/2 constitutes one of the random positioning equilibria charac-
terized by Proposition 7. 25 Increasing r above 1/2 reduces the noise, which benefits
consumers: a match on the first inspection becomes more likely, which reduces the like-
lihood of having to do a second inspection. This, in turn, induces more consumers to
participate, which increases the expected profit of the firm, all the more so as the proba-
bility of finding the more popular product on the first inspection further increases. This
is why these equilibria can be ranked, and the most profitable equilibrium corresponds
to r = r̄. The scope for noisy positioning moreover expands with the popularity gap
between the two products: the best equilibrium boils down to random positioning when
the products are similar, and instead approaches pure positioning when µ1 tends to 1.
The equilibria with less noisy positioning are thus more profitable than the random
positioning equilibrium —by the same token, making positioning less noisy may encourage
the firm to offer more products: positioning is irrelevant when the firm chooses to offer
a single product, but adopting a less noisy positioning policy enhances profit when the
firm chooses to offer an additional product; hence, it tilts the balance in favor of the
latter option —however, the firm may still prefer to offer a single product. 26 Maintaining
some noise can however be optimal for the firm: indeed, noisy positioning is also more







m) + (1− µ1)µ2G (µ2sm)
µ1 + (1− µ1)µ2
.
4.3 Disclosure
We have so far assumed that an inspection reveals product characteristics such as prices
and match valuations, but does not convey any additional information about the identity
of the inspected products —and, thus, of the uninspected ones. Suppose now that the
firm has a “disclosure technology”at its disposal, which enables it to communicate, upon
inspection, the identity of the product. Of course, the availability of such a technology
does not matter if the firm offers a single product. We therefore confine attention to
the subgame n = 2. Moreover, for simplicity, we assume that only two products, 1 and
2, are available.27 We first note that the possibility of disclosure eliminates some of the
25Specifically, it corresponds to the equilibrium in which active consumers start with the first position
but, anticipating a random allocation, always inspect the second position in the absence of a match.





m < Π1 = G (µ1s
m)µ1π
m, which holds for µ2 small
enough, as limµ2→0M2 = µ1 and limµ2→0 c
N
2 (r̄) < µ1s
m (see Appendix H).
27Otherwise we would have to specify additional out-of-equilibrium beliefs if the firm were to deviate
by offering a product that it does not sell in equilibrium and disclosing its identity. When a consumer
then inspects that product first, passive beliefs no longer pin down the consumer’s beliefs about the
not-yet-inspected product.
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equilibria previously identified. Conversely, additional equilibria arise.
In any of the previous equilibria in which consumers keep searching until finding
a match, the firm has no incentive to deviate and disclose the identity of inspected
products, as this could only induce some consumers to stop searching —namely, upon
learning that they already inspected the most popular product(s). It follows that the
possibility of disclosure does not disrupt the monopoly pricing equilibrium characterized
by Proposition 1 for the baseline setting, nor the random and noisy positioning equilibria
characterized by Propositions 7 and 9 for the extended setting with positioning. These
equilibria remain supported by the firm never disclosing any product, or disclosing the
identity of the less popular product(s) with suffi ciently small probability, so as to ensure
that not disclosing does not constitute an excessively bad signal.
By contrast, the non-monopoly pricing equilibria discussed in Remark 3, in which
prices reveal the identity of the products, disappear when disclosure becomes possible.
These equilibria have the feature that popular products are offered at the monopoly
price, whereas less popular products are offered at sub-optimal prices; yet, the firm is
prevented from deviating to the monopoly price, as this would “signal”a popular product
and prompt some consumers to stop searching. Thanks to the disclosure technology,
the firm can instead deviate to the monopoly price and reassure consumers that they
inspected a not-so-popular product, thus encouraging consumers to keep searching in the
absence of a match.
Likewise, the possibility of disclosure destroys the pure positioning equilibrium char-
acterized by Proposition 8, in which some consumers only inspect the most promising
position, even if they have no match with the product in that position. The firm would
therefore have an incentive to swap the positions of the two products, so as to induce
consumers to inspect first the less popular product, and inform them afterwards, so as to
encourage them to inspect the other product as well.
Conversely, the possibility of disclosure gives rise to additional equilibria, in which
the firm selectively discloses (upon inspection) the identity of the less popular products.
For the sake of exposition, in the remainder of this section we assume again that only
two products are available, and focus on the case where the firm chooses to offer both of
them at the monopoly price.28 We start with the case without positioning:
Proposition 10 (disclosure without positioning) Suppose that the disclosure tech-
nology is available (but not the positioning technology) and the firm has chosen to offer
two products (i.e., n = 2); the continuation Perfect Bayesian Equilibria with passive
28When more than two products are available, an additional equilibrium condition must be met to
ensure that the firm would not have an incentive to replace product 1 with a slightly less popular product
and disclose the identity of that product, so as to encourage additional consumers to keep searching. See
the remark at the end of Appendix I.
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beliefs in which the firm offers the most popular products at the monopoly price (i.e.,
I = {1, 2} and p1 = p2 = pm) are:
1. The equilibrium characterized by Proposition 1 (together with not disclosing the
identity of product 1 and disclosing the identity of product 2 with zero or small
enough probability, so as to induce consumers to keep searching in the absence of a
match and of disclosure).
2. A “disclosure”equilibrium in which:
(i) upon inspection, the firm discloses the identity of product 2 with probability one,
and the identity of product 1 with probability strictly less than one (possibly
zero);
(ii) consumers start searching if and only if their search cost is lower than
cD2 ≡
µ1 + µ2 + (1− µ2)µ1
3− µ2
sm (> c2) ,
in which case they keep searching until finding a match unless they learn
(through disclosure, or the absence of it) that they already inspected product 1
and their search cost exceeds µ2s
m.














Proof. See Appendix I.
Proposition 10 confirms that, besides the original equilibrium, a new equilibrium ex-
ists, which provides another solution to the above-mentioned trade-off between consumer
participation and search intensity. On the one hand, as the identity of only one product
is formally disclosed, consumers either learn or infer which product they inspected first;
hence, if it was the more popular product, then they stop searching if they face a high
search cost, namely, if c > µ2s
m. On the other hand, the prospect of avoiding a second
costly inspection encourages more consumers to start searching: cD2 > c2. Depending
on the match probabilities and on the distribution of search costs, either this new equi-
librium or the original equilibrium characterized by Proposition 1 generates more profit.
For example, keeping µ1 and µ2 fixed, the disclosure equilibrium increases profit (i.e.,
ΠD > Π2) if and only if:
G (c2) <




+ (1− µ1)µ2G (µ2sm)
2µ1 + 2 (1− µ1)µ2
.
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The following proposition characterizes the equilibria that arise when disclosure and
positioning are both available:
Proposition 11 (positioning and disclosure) Suppose that the positioning and dis-
closure technologies are both available and that the firm has chosen to offer two products,
n = 2. Then, in the continuation subgame, the only Perfect Bayesian Equilibria with
passive beliefs in which the firm offers the most popular products at the monopoly price
(i.e., I = {1, 2} and p1 = p2 = pm) are the following:
1. The random positioning equilibrium of Proposition 7 and the noisy positioning equi-
libria of Proposition 9 (together with not disclosing the identity of product 1 —except
possibly when placed in second position in the noisy positioning equilibria —and dis-
closing the identity of product 2 with zero or small enough probability, so as to
induce consumers to keep searching in the absence of a match and of disclosure).
2. A disclosure equilibrium similar to that of Proposition 10, sustained thanks to ran-
dom positioning; specifically:
(i) the firm randomizes uniformly over its positioning policy and uses the same
disclosure policy as in Proposition 10;
(ii) consumers adopt the same search behavior as in Proposition 10.
Proof. See Appendix J.
Proposition 11 first confirms that the possibility of disclosure does not disrupt the
random and noisy positioning equilibria characterized by Propositions 7 and 9 (in which
all active consumers search until finding a match), but eliminates the pure positioning
equilibrium identified by Proposition 8 (in which some active consumers only inspect
the first position). It also shows that random positioning can support the “disclosure”
equilibrium characterized by Proposition 10. The intuition is simple and mirrors that
for the no-positioning equilibrium: if the firm uniformly randomizes over its positioning
policy, consumers are indifferent about which position to inspect first; conversely, given
this consumer behavior, the firm is indeed indifferent about its positioning policy.
Thus, when positioning and disclosure are both available, Proposition 11 provides a
third solution, in addition to those already identified by Propositions 8 and 9, to the
trade-off between consumer participation and search intensity. Among these three solu-
tions, the pure positioning equilibrium maximizes the number of consumers who inspect
the more popular product, but minimizes the number of consumers who inspect both
products. The noisy positioning equilibria ensure instead that all active consumers in-
spect the second position in the absence of a match with the product in the first, but
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induces fewer consumers to participate; among these equilibria, participation is maxi-
mized for r = r̄, where marginal consumers are not only indifferent between participating
or not, but also between continuing searching or not. Finally, the “disclosure with no
positioning”equilibrium provides an intermediate solution, both in terms of participation
and search intensity. It can be checked that, depending on the distribution of search
costs, any of these three monopoly pricing equilibria can be the most profitable for the
firm.29
4.4 Welfare analysis
The most profitable type of equilibrium is also the one that maximizes total welfare if
the monopoly price generates relatively more profit than consumer surplus, that is, if
the ratio πm/sm is suffi ciently large. If instead this ratio is small, or if the regulatory
objective focuses on consumer surplus rather than total welfare, then the welfare analysis
will be primarily driven by consumers’interests, which calls for favoring the provision of
information.
Specifically, let SN (r) denote the consumer surplus generated by the random (for
r = 1/2) and noisy positioning equilibria identified by Propositions 7, 9 and 11, SP
denote the consumer surplus generated by the pure positioning equilibrium identified
by Proposition 8, and SD the one generated by the disclosure equilibria identified by
Propositions 10 and 11. We have:
Proposition 12 (consumers prefer having more information) SN (r) increases with
r in the relevant range r ∈ [0, r̄], and SP > max
{
SN (r̄) , SD
}
.
Proof. See Online Appendix E.1.
Among the noisy positioning equilibria, the least noisy one thus Pareto dominates:
providing more accurate information improves search effi ciency, which benefits consumers
but also enhances profit, by inducing more consumers to search. However, consumers’in-
terest may conflict with the profitability of the firm when considering alternative types of
equilibria. Indeed, consumers always prefer the pure positioning equilibrium: it provides
full information about product popularity, which allows consumers to inspect each prod-
uct i if, and only if, its expected value, µis
m, exceeds their search costs. By contrast, as
already noted, the noisy positioning and disclosure equilibria may generate more profit,
by inducing more consumers to keep searching in the absence of a match.
When pure positioning is not an option (e.g., because the firm cannot commit not to
use the disclosure technology, which destroys this equilibrium), consumers’preferences
over disclosure and noisy positioning depend on their search costs. Consumers with low
29See Online Appendix D for an illustration.
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search costs– who will inspect both products anyway– favor positioning, which reduces
their expected number of searches (the more so, the higher µ1). By contrast, consumers
with higher search costs– who would rather not inspect product 2–may favor disclosure
(particularly if µ1 is close to µ2, so that positioning has little impact on the expected
number of searches). Indeed, we have:
Proposition 13 (disclosure versus positioning) For any µ2 ∈ (0, 1), there exists
µD1 (µ2) and µ
N
1 (µ2) satisfying µ2 < µ
D
1 (µ2) ≤ µN1 (µ2) < 1 such that SD > SN (r̄)
for µ1 < µ
D
1 (µ2) and S
N (r̄) > SD for µ1 > µ
N
1 (µ2).
Furthermore, if ce (c) =
∫ c
0
cdG(c)/G(c) is proportional to c, then consumers’and the
firm’s interests are perfectly aligned among noisy positioning and disclosure equilibria.
Otherwise, their interests may conflict in either direction (i.e., SN (r̄) > SD but ΠN (r̄) <
ΠD, or SN (r̄) < SD but ΠN (r̄) > ΠD).
Proof. See Online Appendix E.2.
If µ1 is large enough, noisy positioning– which maximizes the probability of a match,
as all active consumers inspect both products– can reduce the number of expected
searches to a larger extent than disclosure (even for consumers who do not inspect prod-
uct 2 under disclosure). In that case, all consumers prefer noisy positioning to disclosure.
For lower values of µ1, however, positioning has less impact on the expected number of
searches. Some consumers may then favor disclosure to avoid inspecting product 2. When
this is the case, disclosure fosters consumer participation (i.e., cD2 > c
N
2 (r̄)); whether this
also yields higher total consumer surplus depends on product characteristics (e.g., disclo-
sure dominates if µ1 is close to µ2), but also on the distribution of search costs (e.g., how
many consumers have a search cost lower than µ2s
m, rather than between cN2 (r̄) and c
D
2 ).
Disclosure is clearly unattractive if all consumers prefer noisy positioning: disclosure
then discourages consumer participation and thus also generates less profit than noisy
positioning (under which active consumers keep searching until finding a match). More
generally, if the distribution of search costs is such that the average cost ce (c) of active
consumers is proportional to the cost c of the marginal one, then– as in Proposition 4–
the most profitable equilibrium (among the noisy positioning and disclosure ones) is the
one that maximizes consumer surplus (and, thus, total welfare). Otherwise, a bias may
arise, in favor of either disclosure or positioning.
5 Platform
In this section, we study product variety and pricing by a hosting platform. More specif-
ically, we depart from the baseline setting of Section 2 in that each product i is now
produced by a single-product seller i, who sets the price pi for its product if present on
the platform, and the firm is a monopoly platform that charges fixed fees in return for
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hosting the sellers. As in the baseline setting, the (platform) slots are indistinguishable
to consumers, and so search is necessarily random. The timing is as follows:
Stage 1 The platform publicly sets its size n.
Stage 2 The platform chooses the set I of sellers to approach, where |I| ≤ n; this set is
observed by the sellers but not by the consumers.
Stage 3 The platform privately makes take-it-or-leave-it offers (φi)i∈I , which the sellers
then privately accept or reject;30 the set Î ⊆ I of sellers eventually present on the
platform is not observed, but the number of these sellers, n̂ =
∣∣∣Î∣∣∣ ≤ n, is publicly
observed.
Stage 4 Each seller i ∈ Î privately sets its price pi.
Stage 5 Having observed n and n̂, consumers sequentially choose whether to inspect
(randomly) the products offered on the platform.
As in the baseline setting, for any size of the platform set in stage 1, the remaining
stages form a proper subgame of incomplete information. We assume that sellers have
passive beliefs when encountering out-of-equilibrium offers at stage 2. Similarly, we as-
sume that consumers have passive beliefs when encountering out-of-equilibrium prices at
the final stage. We do not restrict sellers’and consumers’beliefs about the identities of
the sellers on the platform in the out-of-equilibrium event in which n̂ < n.
The following proposition is the analog of Proposition 1:
Proposition 14 (platform composition and prices) Fix the size n of the platform.
In the continuation subgame, there exists a PBE with passive beliefs that yields the same
outcome (in terms of product portfolio and prices, consumer surplus and total profit) as
the equilibrium characterized by Proposition 1:
(i) the platform hosts the n most popular products, each of which is offered at the
monopoly price: Î = I = In and pi = pm for every i ∈ In;
(ii) consumers keep searching until finding a match if their search cost is lower than cn,
and do not search otherwise;
(iii) the platform appropriates all the profit through the fees charged to the sellers.
Proof. See Appendix K.
30The equilibrium derived below would be unaffected if the offers and acceptance decisions were ob-
served by the sellers.
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For any given size n adopted by the platform, the equilibrium characterized by Propo-
sition 14 gives the platform exactly the same profit as the firm’s equilibrium profit in
Proposition 1. It follows that the analysis of choice overload and product variety con-
ducted in Section 3 for the baseline setting carries over as well.
Remark 4 (bargaining power) The analysis of choice overload and product variety
still carries over when sellers have some bargaining power in their negotiations with the
platform. Suppose for example that, in stage 3, the fees are determined through “Nash-
in-Nash”bilateral bargaining; that is, the platform and every seller i ∈ I engage in Nash
bargaining, holding fixed the equilibrium agreements between the platform and the sellers
in I \ {i}. As sellers obtain zero profit in the absence of an agreement and the platform
derives its profit solely through the fixed fees, it follows that the platform obtains a fraction
ω ∈ (0, 1], reflecting its bargaining power in bilateral negotiations, of the profit generated
by each seller on the platform.31 Hence, the equilibrium profit of the platform is exactly
a fraction ω of the equilibrium profit obtained under take-it-or-leave-it offers, and the
implications for the equilibrium product variety are therefore unchanged.
6 Conclusion
We analyze pricing and product choice by a firm in a setting where products differ in
their ex ante appeal (“popularity”) and initially uninformed consumers can sequentially
search through the offered products. We first consider the case of random (i.e., non-
directed) search. Interestingly, as in the case of (ex ante) symmetric products, only those
consumers with low enough search costs become active, but all those who start searching
become seemingly addicted to it and keep searching until finding a match. Building on
this insight, we show that this search pattern generates choice overload: increasing the
number of products offered– which reduces their popularity on average– induces marginal
consumers to stop searching. As a result, even if additional products can be offered at
no cost, and despite the fact that expanding the product range increases the probability
of a purchase from each active consumer, the firm chooses to offer a limited number of
products. Compared with the socially optimal product portfolio, the firm offers too much
(resp., too little) variety when the average search cost of active consumers is increasing
(resp., decreasing) in the search cost of the marginal consumer.
We then explore– for a product range limited to two products– the firm’s incentive to
direct consumer search by assigning products to distinguishable “slots”or, alternatively,
31Let πi denote the profit obtained by seller i ∈ I if it joins the platform. If the negotiation breaks
down, seller i ∈ I obtains πi = 0 and the platform obtains Π =
∑
j∈(I\{i}) φj ; if instead the negotiation
is successful, their profits are respectively π̂i = πi − φi and Π̂ = Π + φi. The Nash bargaining rule then
yields φi = Π̂−Π = ω
(




by making informative product recommendations. Compared with pure random search,
directing consumer search increases the number of active consumers– who can then first
inspect the most popular product. But, unless there is suffi cient randomness in the firm’s
positioning or recommendation strategies, directing consumer search also induces some
consumers to stop searching even in the absence of a match. As a result, the firm may
therefore want to adopt strategies that create enough uncertainty in consumers’minds–
for instance, by making noisy recommendations. Finally, we show how our insights carry
over to the case of a platform hosting third-party sellers.
Extending the analysis of firms’communication strategies and their impact on con-
sumer search behavior to arbitrarily large product portfolios would be an interesting
avenue for future research, particularly in the light of the diversity of practices adopted
by firms in different industries and the policy concerns that they sometimes generate.
Further, while we have focused on the case of a monopolist, another important avenue
would be to study the implications for competition of firms’and platforms’influence over
consumers’information on product popularity.
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Appendix
A Proof of Lemma 1
Fix a product portfolio, I of size n and, for k ∈ {1, ..., n}, let mk ∈ {0, 1} denote whether
a match occurs (mk = 1) or not (mk = 0) at the kth inspection, Mk ≡ Σh=kh=1mh denote
the number of matches at the first k inspections (with the convention M0 = 0) and
αk ≡ Pr [mk = 1 |Mk−1 = 0]
denote the probability of a match at the kth inspection, conditional on not having had
any match at the previous k − 1 inspections. Furthermore, for k ∈ {2, ..., n}, let
α̂k ≡ Pr [mk = 1 |Mk−2 = 0 and mk−1 = 1]
denote the probability of a match at the kth inspection, conditional on not having had
any match at the previous k − 2 inspections and having had a match at the (k − 1)th
inspection.
We first show that observing a match makes consumers more pessimistic about future
matches:
Lemma 7 (a match brings bad news about future matches) For k ∈ {2, ..., n},
αk > α̂k.
Proof. For k ∈ {1, ..., n}, let Pk denote the sub-portfolio of products visited at the
first k inspections, and
Pk ≡ {J ⊆ I | |J | = k}
denote the set of such sub-portfolios (with the convention P0 = P0 = ∅). For k ∈








Pr [Pk−2 = Jk−2] β̂k (Jk−2) ,
where
βk (Jk−2) = Pr [mk = 1 |Mk−1 = 0 and Pk−2 = Jk−2] ,
β̂k (Jk−2) = Pr [mk = 1 |Mk−2 = 0, mk−1 = 1 and Pk−2 = Jk−2] .
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Fix Jk−2, and let n̂ ≡
∣∣IJ k−2∣∣ (= n+ 2− k) denote the size of the complement sub-
portfolio IJ k−2, and, for i ∈ In̂ ≡ {1, ..., n̂}, let µ̂i denote the popularity of its ith most
popular product; we thus have: and µ̂1 > ... > µ̂n̂. βk (Jk−2) can then be expressed as:
βk (Jk−2) = Pr [mk = 1 |Mk−2 = 0,mk−1 = 0 and Pk−2 = Jk−2]
=
Pr [mk−1 = 0 and mk = 1 | Pk−2 = Jk−2 and Mk−2 = 0]

























































n̂ (1− µ̂)− (1− µ̂i)
n̂2 (1− µ̂)− n̂ (1− µ̂)
=
n̂ (1− µ̂)− (1− µ̂i)







denotes the expected popularity of the products in the complement sub-portfolio IJ k−2.
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Likewise, β̂k (Jk−2) can be expressed as:
β̂k (Jk−2) = Pr [mk = 1 |Mk−2 = 0,mk−1 = 1 and Pk−2 = Jk−2]
=
Pr [mk−1 = 1 and mk = 1 | Pk−2 = Jk−2 and Mk−2 = 0]

















































n̂ (n̂− 1) µ̂ .
The weight distribution used for β̂k (Jk−2), {ŵi}i∈{1,...,n̂}, dominates (in the sense of
first-order stochastic dominance) the weight distribution used for βk (Jk−2), {wi}i∈{1,...,n̂}:
for any i ∈ {1, ..., n̂}, we have:
i∑
j=1








n̂ (n̂− 1) (1− µ̂) −
n̂µ̂− µ̂j









µ̂− n̂µ̂ (1− µ̂) + µ̂j (1− µ̂)







n̂ (n̂− 1) (1− µ̂) µ̂
≥ 0,
where the inequality is strict for i < n and follows from µ̂1 > ... > µ̂n̂ and the definition
of µ̂.
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As µ̂1 > ... > µ̂n̂, it follows that βk (Jk−2) > β̂k (Jk−2) for any Jk−2 ∈ Pk−2, which in
turn implies αk > α̂k.
Given the information available after the first k inspection, the expected probability
of having a match is the same for all future inspections. Hence, we have:
αk = Pr [mk = 1 |Mk−1 = 0]
= Pr [mk+1 = 1 |Mk−1 = 0]
= Pr [mk = 1 |Mk−1 = 0] Pr [mk+1 = 1 |Mk−1 = 0 and mk = 1]
+ Pr [mk = 0 |Mk−1 = 0] Pr [mk+1 = 1 |Mk−1 = 0 and mk = 0]
= αkα̂k+1 + (1− αk)αk+1
= αk+1 + αk (α̂k+1 − αk+1)
< αk+1,
where the inequality follows from Lemma 7.
It follows that if a consumer finds it optimal to make the first inspection, he will
optimally continue to inspect all products until he has found a match (and learned his
match-conditional valuation). To see this, suppose by way of contradiction, that the con-
sumer finds it optimal to stop searching after k < n inspections. This requires αk+1sm ≤ c
as, otherwise, the consumer would have an incentive to search at least one more time.
But the consumer must also find it optimal to conduct the kth inspection, knowing that it
will be the last one, which in turn requires αksm ≥ c. We thus have αksm ≥ c ≥ αk+1sm,
a contradiction.
B Proof of Lemma 2
Fix the size n of the product line and consider the associated continuation subgame.
Belief consistency requires consumers to update their beliefs about product characteristics
and prices on the basis of observed matches and prices. Thus, for any given number





about the firm’s product portfolio and prices in the remaining n − k slots, given the
observed sequence of matches mk = (m1, ...,mk) and the observed sequence of prices
pk = (p1, ..., pk).32
We first show that consumers with higher realized valuations are more likely to keep
searching:
32For simplicity of notation, we do not introduce k as an argument of the function ν; however, it does
depend on k through the length of the sequences mk and pk. A similar comment applies to the other
functions introduced below.
40
Lemma 8 (consumer search) Suppose that consumers’beliefs are consistent and that
their search strategy is optimal given these beliefs. For any k ∈ {1, ..., n− 1}, any mk
satisfying
∑k
i=1 mi ≥ 1 and any pk = (p1, ..., pk), let σ
(
mk;pk | v, c
)
denote a consumer’s
probability of inspecting one more slot when facing a search cost c and having observed




mk;pk | v, c
)
> 0 =⇒ σ
(
mk;pk | v′, c′
)
= 1 for any v′ ≥ v and c′ < c.
Proof. For any k ∈ {1, ..., n− 1}, mk satisfying
∑k







ph ∈ pk | mh = 1
}
denote the lowest price for the products which









respectively, the probability that an additional inspection would expose them to product
i = 1, 2, ..., and the price of this product. Finally, let ψ
(
pk;mk | v, c
)
denote the expected
benefit (gross of the search cost) of an (k + 1)th inspection, assuming optimal search
behavior thereafter (and netting out search costs of any subsequent inspections).
We start by showing that the following property (Pk) holds for every k ∈ {1, ..., n− 1}:
for anymk = (m1, ...,mk) satisfying
∑k
i=1 mi ≥ 1 and any pk = (p1, ..., pk), ψ
(
pk;mk | v, c
)
is weakly increasing in v, and weakly decreasing in c.
We first establish that (Pn−1) holds: for any mn−1 satisfying
∑n−1




















































The conclusion follows from the fact that b
(
p; p | v
)
is weakly increasing in v and inde-
pendent from c.
Reasoning by induction, suppose now that (Pk+1) holds. For any mk = (m1, ...,mk)
satisfying
∑k
i=1mi ≥ 1 and any pk = (p1, ..., pk), any v and any c, we have:
ψ
(






















mk;pk, p̂ | v, c
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The conclusion then follows from the observation that every term in ψ̂i is weakly increas-
ing in v and weakly decreasing in c.
By construction, a consumer having observed the match and price sequences mk and
pk and a valuation v on the first k inspected slots is willing to search an additional slot if
ψ
(
mk;pk | v, c
)
≥ c. It then follows from (Pk) that ψ
(
mk;pk | v′, c′
)
> c′ for any v′ ≥ v
and c′ < c; hence, any consumer with such valuation v′ and cost c′ strictly prefers to
inspect an additional slot.
We now prove Lemma 2. Fix the size n of the product line, the composition I of the
product portfolio and the prices of these products, and consider a consumer with search
cost c. If the consumer starts searching, the expected profit that he generates can be
expressed as





ρ (m | s)E [Π | c, s,m]
where s ∈ In is an arbitrary search sequence33 and S (I) is the set of such sequences,
m ∈ {0, 1}n is an arbitrary sequence of matches,
ρ (m | s) ≡ Πni=1µmisi (1− µsi)
1−mi
denotes the probability of match sequence m, conditional on s, and E [Π | c, s,m] rep-
resents the expected profit (with respect to the realized valuation v) obtained from con-
sumers facing a search cost c, taking as a given the search sequence s = (s1, ..., sn) ∈ S (I)
and the match sequence m = (m1, ...,mn) that they would face if they were to inspect
all products, but assuming that these consumers search optimally given their (consistent)
beliefs (and may thus stop searching before reaching the end of the sequence).
We now consider a given (c, s,m) and provide an upper bound for E [Π | c, s,m]. If∑n
k=1mk = 0, the firm obtains zero profit. Consider now the case where
∑n
k=1mk ≥ 1.
From Lemma 8, a consumer who buys at price p when drawing a valuation v buys at
a weakly lower price p′ ≤ p whenever drawing a higher valuation v′ > v, as the higher
valuation induces the consumer to inspect at least as many products. Let v̂ denote the
infimum of the valuations for which a consumer buys,34 and p (v) denote the price at
which a consumer with valuation v > v̂ buys. As noted above, p (v) is weakly decreasing;
33That is, sk ∈ I denotes the index of the kth product according to the search sequence s.
34 v̂ depends on (c, s,m); we drop the argument to simplify the exposition.
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hence, p̂ = limv−→v̂+ {p (v)} exists and satisfies, for every v ≥ v̂:
p (v) ≤ p̂ ≤ v̂,
where the first inequality stems from the monotonicity of p (v), and the second inequality
follows from the fact that, by construction, p (v) ≤ v for any v (above but) arbitrarily
close to v̂. Hence, we have:
E [Π | c, s,m] =
∫ +∞
v̂
p (v) dF (v) ≤
∫ +∞
v̂
v̂dF (v) = [1− F (v̂)] v̂ ≤ πm,
where the last inequality follows from πm = max {[1− F (p)] p}.
As ∑
m∈{0,1}n
ρ (m | s) ≡ 1− Πni=1 (1− µi) = M (I) ,
aggregating over all possible product and match sequences yields:





ρ (m | s) πm = M (I) πm ≤M (In) πm. (10)
C Proof of Proposition 1
Fix the portfolio size chosen by the firm in the first stage, n, and consider the continuation
subgame.
Part (ii). Suppose that the firm offers the most popular products at the monopoly
price: I = In and pi = pm for every i ∈ In. A consumer then stops searching upon
the first match: he purchases the product if his match-conditional valuation exceeds
the charged price, and gives up without any purchase otherwise. From Lemma 1, any
consumer who starts searching keeps searching until finding a match. A consumer will
therefore engage in search if the expected probability of a match times the expected
surplus conditional on a match, M(In)sm, exceeds the expected search cost, which is
equal to the expected number of searches times the consumer’s cost per search, N(In)c,
i.e., if c < cn, and will not engage in search if c > cn.
Part (i). We first show that offering the most popular products at the monopoly
prices constitutes a PBE with passive beliefs. Suppose that the firm deviates and offers
the product portfolio Id at prices (pdi )i∈Id. Consumers cannot observe this deviation
before their initial search decision. Hence, they start searching if c < cn, and do not
do so if c > cn. As passive beliefs are consistent, Lemma 2 implies that the deviation
cannot generate an expected profit exceeding G (cn)M (In) πm, which is the equilibrium
expected profit. Hence, the deviation is not profitable.
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To conclude the proof, we first show that this PBE is belief-proof, before estab-
lishing uniqueness. Consider any other alternative consumers’consistent off-equilibrium
beliefs and induced off-equilibrium behavior. By construction, along the equilibrium
path consumers’beliefs are pinned down by Bayes’rule, and their behavior constitutes a
best-response to the firm’s equilibrium strategy, given these beliefs. It remains to check
that the equilibrium strategy of the firm constitutes a best-response to these consumer
strategies; this follows again from Lemma 2.
Turning to uniqueness, we first note that, in any PBE in which the firm offers the
most popular products at the monopoly price (i.e., I = In and pi = pm for every i ∈ In),
consumers’equilibrium behavior is given by part (ii), which leads to the same equilibrium
outcome as above. Consider now any other candidate belief-proof PBE outcome, in which
the firm chooses a different product portfolio and/or different prices. The firm then obtains
an expected profit of the form G (c) Π, where c denotes the cost threshold determining
consumers’decision to start searching35 and Π denotes the firm’s expected per-consumer
profit. From (10) in the proof of Lemma 2, we then have Π < M (In) πm. To see this,
suppose first that the firm chooses I 6= In. We then have Π ≤ M (I) πm < M (In) πm.
If the firm choose I = In and a price pi 6= pm for at least one product i ∈ In, then Π
satisfies:








denotes the probability of having a match with product i only. Using π (pi) < πm yields
Π < M (In) πm.
Suppose now that the firm deviates and: (i) selects the most popular products (i.e.,
I = In) and (ii) prices them at the same price, which is chosen arbitrarily close to pm
among the out-of-equilibrium prices. Suppose further that consumers have “optimistic
beliefs”and interpret this unexpected price as signalling that the firm stuck to the product
portfolio I but offers all uninspected products at largely subsidized prices (zero price,
say). As long as consumers do not have a match, these beliefs induce consumers to be
more optimistic about the probability of a match at next inspections (from Lemma 1)
and about the prices found at these inspections. Hence, consumers who started searching
keep searching until finding a match; whether or not they keep doing so afterwards,
they then end up buying if the realized valuation exceeds p, and not buying otherwise.
Hence, the deviation gives the firm an per-consumer expected profit arbitrarily close to
35Whenever consumers’beliefs are consistent, and thus independent of their search cost, there indeed
exists such a cost threshold, equal to consumers’expected utility from starting inspecting the products
(gross of the cost of the first inspection, but net of the costs of any additional inspections), below which
consumers starts searching and above which they do not do so.
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M (In)πm > Π, making the deviation profitable.
D Proof of Lemma 3
Let λi ≡ 1− µi denote the probability of not having a match with product i. From (1),
increasing the size of the product line from n to n+ 1, changes the expected probability
of a match by
M(In+1)−M(In) = λ1...λn(1− λn+1) > 0,
where the inequality follows from λi ∈ (0, 1) for any i ∈ In+1.
For any n ∈ N∗ and any s ∈ S(In), let




denote the expected number of searches needed to find a match in In given the search


















where, for any s ∈ S(In) and any i ∈ In+1,




sj for j < i,
n+ 1 for j = i,
sj−1 for j > i.
Furthermore, we have
ϕn+1(σ(s, n+ 1))− ϕn(s) = λs1 ...λsn > 0,
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and, for i ∈ In,




(λn+1 − λsk)λs1 ...λsk−1
}
+ λs1 ...λsn−1λn+1 > 0,

















E Proof of Part (ii) of Proposition 2
Fix n and (µ1, ..., µn), and let λi ≡ 1 − µi denote the probability of not having a match




denote the geometric mean of these probabilities. Note that, by assumption, λ1 < ... < λn.
We first establish:
Lemma 9 cn ≤ (1− λ̂n)sm.
Proof. From (1) and the definition of λ̂n, we have:
M(In) = 1− λ̂
n
n.
As λ1 < λn, there exist two products i and j such that λi < λ̂n < λj. Consider the
following geometric-mean-preserving contraction, which consists in replacing λi and λj
by, respectively, λ̃i and λ̃j such that: (i) λ̃iλ̃j = λiλj; and (ii) (λ̃i−λi)(λ̃j−λj) = 0. That
is, the transformation preserves the geometric mean and moves both probabilities toward
the geometric mean, up to the point that at least one of them is equal to it. For the sake
of exposition, let Ĩn denote the set of products with no-match probabilities (λ̃1, ..., λ̃n),
where λ̃k = λk if k /∈ {i, j}.



























Sk(In) ≡ {(s1, ..., sk) ∈ (In)k|s1 6= ... 6= sk}.
We now show that replacing In with Ĩn decreases the expected number of searches. To
see this, note first that this transformation does not affect the terms in Tk in which either






(λi − λ̃i + λj − λ̃j)λs1 ...λsk−1 ,
where
S̃k−1(In) ≡ {(s1, ..., sk−1) ∈ (In \ {i, j})k−1|s1 6= ... 6= sk−1)},
and, using the fact that (λ̃i, λ̃j) is a geometric-mean-preserving contraction of (λi, λj),
λi + λj > λ̃i + λ̃j.
To see the last inequality, note that the transformation is the integral over infinitesimal
changes dλi and dλj such that d(λiλj) = λjdλi + λidλj = 0 and dλi > 0. As λi < λj, the
induced infinitesimal change in λi + λj is given by






It follows that, for every k ∈ In−1, Tk(In) > Tk(Ĩn). Hence, the transformation (i) reduces
the expected number of searches needed to find a first match, and (ii) reduces (by at least
one) the number of no-match probabilities that are different from the geometric mean
λ̂n. Re-iterating the process at most n times results in replacing In with În, where În is
the set of products with no-match probabilities (λ̂n, ..., λ̂), and yields:











sm = (1− λ̂n)sm.
To conclude the proof, it suffi ces to note that limn→∞ λn = 1 (i.e., limn→∞ µn = 0)
implies limn→∞ λ̂n = 1. As log λn is strictly increasing in n and limn→∞ log λn = 0, for
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any ε > 0, there exists n̂ such that
log λn ≥ −
ε
2





























where the last expression lies between −ε and 0 for n large enough. Hence, as n goes to
infinity, log λ̂n tends to 0, and thus λ̂n tends to 1.
F Proof of Lemma 6
Suppose without loss of generality that the firm allocates product 1 to slot 1 with proba-
bility r ∈ (1/2, 1], and let µi denote the probability that slot i ∈ {1, 2} generates a match
on a first visit, and µ̄i denote the probability that slot i ∈ {1, 2} generates a match on a
second visit, conditional on the other slot not having generated a match on the first visit.
We have:
µ1 ≡ rµ1 + (1− r)µ2,
µ2 ≡ (1− r)µ1 + rµ2,
and
µ̄1 ≡ r (1− µ2)µ1 + (1− r) (1− µ1)µ2
r (1− µ2) + (1− r) (1− µ1)
=
µ1 − µ1µ2
1− µ2 , (11)
µ̄2 ≡ r (1− µ1)µ2 + (1− r) (1− µ2)µ1
r (1− µ1) + (1− r) (1− µ2)
=
µ2 − µ1µ2
1− µ1 , (12)
As r > 1/2, µ1 > µ2 and µ̄1 > µ̄2; the first inequality is obvious and the second one
follows from:
µ̄1 − µ̄2 = µ
1 − µ2
(1− µ1) (1− µ2)
[





(1− µ1) (1− µ2)






where the second equality stems from µ1 + µ2 = µ1 + µ2.
When a consumer starts visiting slot i, his expected utility is given by, for j 6= i ∈
{1, 2}:






0, µ̄jsm − c
}
.
If c ≥ µ̄1sm (> µ̄2sm), then we have:





where the strict inequality follows from µ1 > µ2. If instead c < µ̄1sm, then we have:








































where the equality relies on (11) and (12), and the strict inequality follows again from
µ1 > µ2.
G Proof of Proposition 8
Consider a candidate continuation equilibrium in which the firm offers the two most
popular products at the monopoly price (i.e., I = {1, 2} and p1 = p2 = pm) and places
product 1 in first position, and product 2 in second position. From Lemma 6, active
consumers then start with the first position. Obviously, consumers with search cost
c ≤ µ1sm have an incentive to do so, and will stop searching in case of a match; in
the absence of a march, consumers have an incentive to inspect the other position only
if c ≤ µ2sm (< µ1sm). Conversely, consumers with search cost exceeding µ1sm will not
search, and those with a search cost c ∈ (µ2sm, µ1sm) will only inspect the first position,
even in the absence of a match.
This candidate equilibrium thus yields an expected profit equal to
Π∗ = [G (µ1s
m)µ1 +G (µ2s
m) (1− µ1)µ2] πm.
We first check that these strategies constitute an equilibrium.36 Suppose that the
firm deviates and offers product i at price p1 in first position, and product j at price p2
36It suffi ces to check that there is no profitable deviation in pure strategies (over positions and prices);
this implies that there is no profitable deviation in mixed strategies either, as the expected profit from
a probability distribution over positions and prices is equal to the same probability distribution over
profits from a realized vector of positions and prices.
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in second position (we use superscripts to refer to positions, as opposed to products).
As this deviation is not observed by consumers, it does not affect their decision about
whether to start searching. Hence, consumers with search cost c > µ1s
m do not search,
whereas those with c < µ1s
m inspect the first position. Furthermore, with passive beliefs:
• in the absence of a match, observing an unexpected price does not affect active
consumers’search behavior: they inspect the second position if c < µ2s
m, and stop
searching if c > µ2s
m;
• in case of a match, they inspect the second position if c < µ2 (max {v, p1} − pm),
and stop searching if c > µ2 (max {v, p1} − pm).
Following an approach similar to that of the proof of Lemma 2, let E [Π|c,m] denote
the expected profit (with respect to the realized valuation v) obtained from active con-
sumers with cost c, given the search behavior just described, and taking as a given the
match sequence m = (m1,m2) that they would face if they were to visit both positions.
The insight from Lemma 2 carries over: conditional on having a match, a consumer
cannot generate a higher expected profit than maxp π (p) = πm. Indeed, we have:
• in the absence of any match, consumers generate zero profit: E[Π|c, (0, 0)] = 0;
• if there would be a match only with the product placed in ith position, consumers
generate an expected profit π (pi) if c < µis
m, and no profit otherwise:




≤ πm and E [Π|c, (0, 1)] =
{
π (p2) ≤ πm if c < µ2sm,
0 if c > µ2s
m.
• if instead they would have a match with both products, the following possible cases
arise:
— If p1 ≤ p2 or c > µ2 (p1 − pm), then consumers buy at p1 if v ≥ p1, and
do not buy otherwise: in the first case, p1 is obviously the relevant price,
regardless of whether consumers inspect the second position; and in the sec-
ond case, p1 remains the relevant price as consumers never inspect the sec-
ond position, as they believe that this would bring an expected benefit equal
to max {µ2 (p1 − pm) , 0} if v ≥ p1, and equal to max {µ2 (v − pm) , 0} ≤
max {µ2 (p1 − pm) , 0} if v < p1. We thus have:





— If p1 > p2 and c < µ2 (p1 − pm), then consumers never buy at p1: consumers
with a match on the first inspection and v ≥ p1 continue to search, and thus
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end-up buying at p2. It follows that consumers who buy do so at p2; as
consumers would not buy if their valuations lie below p2, we have:











It follows that the expected profit satisfies:
E [Π|c, (1, 1)] ≤
{
π (p1) if p1 ≤ p2 or c > µ2 (p1 − pm) ,
π (p2) if p1 > p2 and c < µ2 (p
1 − pm) ,
≤ πm.
Hence, following the deviation, the expected profit obtained from active consumers
(i.e., those with cost c < µ1s























m) πm + µi [G (µ1s
m)−G (µ2sm)] πm.
The last expression is maximal when the firm selects the two most popular products (i.e.,
I = {1, 2}), so as to maximize the first term, and moreover places the most popular
product (product 1) in first position, so as to maximize the second term; as the resulting
profit then corresponds to the candidate equilibrium profit Π∗, the deviation is therefore
unprofitable.
To conclude the proof, consider an alternative “pure positioning”equilibrium in which
the firm offers products i in first position and j in second position, both at monopoly
prices. From Lemma 6, consumers then start searching by inspecting the position hosting
the more popular product, say position 1; it follows that consumers with cost c < µis
m
inspect position i, and among these, those with c < µjs
m also inspect the other position
in the absence of a match on the first inspection. The firm’s expected profit is therefore:


































≤ [1− (1− µ1) (1− µ2)]G (µ2sm) πm + µ1 [G (µ1sm)−G (µ2sm)] πm.
As altering the product portfolio and the positioning policy cannot be detected by
consumers, who would therefore stick to the same search behavior, the last expression
corresponds to the profit that the firm could obtain by offering instead product 1 in first
position and product 2 in second position.
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H Proof of Proposition 9
Consider a candidate continuation equilibrium in which the firm offers the two most
popular products at the monopoly price (i.e., I = {1, 2} and p1 = p2 = pm) and: (i) with
probability r ∈ (1/2, 1), it places product 1 in first position, and product 2 in second
position; (ii) with complementary probability, it does the opposite. From Lemma 6,
active consumers start with the first position, where they are more likely to find the more
popular product.
We first show that active consumers must continue to search in the absence of a
match. Using again superscripts to refer to positions, the probability of a match on the
first inspection is
µ1 (r) = rµ1 + (1− r)µ2,
which decreases from (µ1 + µ2) /2 to µ2 as r increases from 1/2 to 1. If a fraction ξ > 0
of active consumers do not inspect the second position in the absence of a match on their
first inspection, then the average probability of a match is
ξµ1 (r) + (1− ξ)M2,
where
M2 ≡ µ1 + µ2 − µ1µ2
denotes the total probability of having a match when inspecting both products. It would
therefore be profitable for the firm to deviate and place product 1 in first position with
probability 1, so as to increase this probability of a match to
ξµ1 + (1− ξ)M2.
Hence, active consumers must keep searching in the absence of a match. Their overall
probability of a match is thus given byM2, and the expected number of searches is equal
to




× 2 = 2− µ1 (r) .
Consumers therefore choose to start searching if their search cost c satisfies
c ≤ cN2 (r) ≡
M2s
m
2− µ1 (r) .
As µ1 (r) increases with r, so does cN2 (r).
When they do not have a match, consumers’expected probability of a match with
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the other product becomes:
µ̄2 (r) ≡ r (1− µ1)µ2 + (1− r) (1− µ2)µ1
r (1− µ1) + (1− r) (1− µ2)
,
which decreases37 from µ1 to µ2 as r increases from 0 to 1 and, for r = 1/2, coincides
with the updated probability in the absence of positioning, namely,
µ2 ≡ µ1 + µ2 − 2µ1µ2
2− µ1 − µ2
.
All active consumers will indeed choose to inspect the second position if the first
inspection does not produce a match if cN2 (r) ≤ µ̄2 (r) sm. We know that this holds in
the absence of positioning, that is, for r = 1/2. Conversely, for r = 1 we have:38
cN2 (1) =
µ1 + µ2 − µ1µ2
2− µ1
sm > µ2s
m = µ̄2 (1) sm.
As cN2 (r) increases with r whereas µ̄
2 (r) is a decreasing function of r, it follows that
there exists r̄ ∈ (1/2, 1) such that all consumers who start searching keep searching until
finding a match as long as r ≤ r̄.
In this candidate equilibrium, each match generates an expected profit πm and con-




consumers who start searching, and each one
obtains a match with probability M2, the total expected profit and expected surplus are
respectively given by











As cN2 (r) increases with r, so do the expected profit and consumer surplus; further-
more, they coincide with the no positioning equilibrium values when r = 1/2. The
threshold r̄ is such that cN2 (r) = µ̄








It is therefore decreasing in µ2, and increases from 1/2 to 1 as µ1 increases from µ2 to 1.
Hence, the set of noisy positioning equilibria expands with the (un-)popularity ratio 1−µ2
1−µ1
:
the best (i.e., least noisy) one boils down to random positioning when the two products
37To see this, note that µ̂2 (r) is a weighted average of µ1 and µ2 < µ1, with a relative weight on µ2
that increases with r.
38The inequality amounts to
µ1 + µ2 − µ1µ2 > 2µ2 − µ1µ2 ⇐⇒ µ1 > µ2.
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have a similar popularity (i.e., µ1 = µ2), and converges to pure positioning as µ1 tends
to 1.
We now check that the firm has no incentive to deviate.39 To see this, suppose that
it does, and offers products i at price p1 in slot 1, and product j at price p2 in slot
2. As before, the deviation does not affect consumers’decision about whether to start
searching; hence, consumers with search cost c > cN2 (r) do not search, whereas those
with c < cN2 (r) start searching by inspecting slot 1. Furthermore, with passive beliefs:
• in the absence of a match, observing an unexpected price does not affect active
consumers’search behavior, who thus keep searching;
• in case of a match, they inspect slot 2 if c < µ2 (r) (max {v, p1} − pm), and stop
searching if c > µ2 (r) (max {v, p1} − pm), where
µ2 (r) ≡ rµ1µ2 + (1− r)µ2µ1
rµ1 + (1− r)µ2
,
Following again a similar approach as in the proof of Lemma 2, let E [Π|c,m] denote
the expected profit (with respect to the realized valuation v) obtained from active con-
sumers with cost c, given the search behavior just described, and taking as a given the
match sequencem = (m1,m2) that they would face if they were to visit both slots. As all
active consumers keep searching until finding a match, consumers who would have a match
only with the product allocated to slot i now generate an expected profit π (pi) ≤ πm. If
instead they would have a match with both products, then, following the same steps as
in Appendix G for the proof of Proposition 8 yields:
E [Π|c, (1, 1)] ≤
{
π (p1) if p1 ≤ p2 or c > µ2 (r) (p1 − pm) ,
π (p2) if p1 > p2 and c < µ2 (r) (p1 − pm) ,
≤ πm.
Hence, following the deviation, the expected profit obtained from active consumers



















where the last expression is maximal when the firm selects the two most popular products
(i.e., I = {1, 2}), and then corresponds to the candidate equilibrium profit ΠR (r); the
deviation is therefore unprofitable.
39By the argument in footnote 36 it suffi ces to check for deviations in pure strategies.
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To conclude the proof, the same reasoning as at the end of the proof of Proposition
8 can be used to show that it is not profitable to offer other products than the two
most popular ones. To see this, consider a candidate equilibrium in which the firm
offers at monopoly prices a set of products with random positioning, in such a way
that if offers some product k 6∈ {1, 2} with positive probability εk and does not offer
product i ∈ {1, 2} with positive probability εi. Replacing product k with product j with
probability min{εi, εk} would be undetected by consumers, who would therefore stick to
the same search behavior, and would increase the expected profit of the firm by increasing
the overall probability of a match.
Summing-up, we have:
• Proposition 7 characterizes all the equilibria with passive beliefs and monopoly
pricing in which the products are uniformly randomly assigned to slots (i.e., r =
1/2);
• Proposition 8 characterizes instead all the equilibria with passive beliefs and monopoly
pricing in which the products are deterministically assigned to slots (i.e., r = 1);
and
• the above analysis characterizes all the equilibria with passive beliefs and monopoly
pricing in which the allocation of products to slots is a non-degenerate lottery that
is not uniform (i.e., 1/2 < r < 1).
I Proof of Proposition 10
We suppose here that slots are indistinguishable (i.e., the positioning technology is not
available) and the firm has chosen to offer the two products (i.e., n = 2). As mentioned
in the text, to simplify the exposition and avoid discussing out-of-equilibrium beliefs in
case the firm were to deviate and disclose the identity of unexpected products, we further
assume that only two products are available; it is therefore common knowledge that the
firm offers the two most popular products (i.e., I = {1, 2}, and we study the continuation
equilibria in which the firm charges monopoly prices (i.e., p1 = p2 = pm). We denote
by δi the probability with which the firm discloses the identity of product i = 1, 2 upon
inspection.
Consider first a candidate equilibrium such that δ1 < δ2 = 1. Observing that the
identity of the first inspected product is undisclosed then reveals that it was product
1; hence, in any such equilibrium, active consumers fully learn the identity of the first
inspected product. Intuitively, marginal consumers (i.e., those consumers indifferent
between starting a search or not) will be willing to keep searching, in the absence of a
match on the first inspection, only when becoming more optimistic about the product
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assigned to the remaining slot, that is, when encountering the less popular product on









m + (1− µ2) (µ1sm − c)]
⇔ c = cD2 ≡
µ1 + µ2 + (1− µ2)µ1
3− µ2
sm.












thus validating the working assumption that marginal active consumers keep searching
only when expecting to find product 1 in the remaining slot. It can moreover be checked
that, compared with the equilibrium that arises in the absence of disclosure, more con-
sumers now start searching:
cD2 − c2 =
µ1 + µ2 + (1− µ2)µ1
3− µ2





(2− µ2) (1− µ1)
(3− µ2) (4− µ1 − µ2)
(µ1 − µ2) sm > 0.































We now check that the firm has no incentive to deviate. To see this, suppose that
it does and offers products 1 and 2 at prices p1 and p2. As the deviation does not
affect consumers’decisions about whether to start searching, consumers with search cost
c > cD2 do not search, whereas those with c < c
D
2 start searching and inspect either
product with equal probability. Furthermore, with passive beliefs, consumers’decision to
make a second inspection depends on the disclosure outcome of their first inspection only
through their expectation about the identity of the remaining product; specifically, if the
first product was disclosed to be product 2, then they expect to encounter product 1,
offered at the monopoly price; otherwise (i.e., in the absence of disclosure, or if disclosure
reveals that they first inspected product 1), consumers expect to encounter product 2
offered at the monopoly price. Therefore, after the first inspection:
• In the absence of a match:
— if disclosure reveals that the first inspected product was product 2, then con-
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sumers expect to encounter product 1 offered at the monopoly price and, as
cD2 < µ1s
m, all active consumers inspect the remaining product;
— otherwise, they expect to encounter product 1 offered at the monopoly price






• In case of a match at the expected monopoly price, consumers stop searching and
buy if their valuation exceeds the monopoly price.
• In case of a match at an unexpected price p1, consumers inspect the remaining
slot only if their cost lies below c < µ2 (max {v, p1} − pm), where µ2 = µ1 if the
inspected product was disclosed to be product 2, and µ2 = µ2 otherwise.
Adapting the approach of used in the proof of Lemma 2, let E [Π | c, s,m, δ] denote the
expected profit (with respect to the realized valuation v) obtained from active consumers
with cost c, given the search behavior just described, the product sequence s = (s1, s2) ∈
{(1, 2) , (2, 1)} and the match sequence m = (m1,m2) ∈ {0, 1}2 that they would face
if they were to visit both slots, and the disclosure outcome δ ∈ {0, 1, 2}. Consumers
who have a match only in their first inspection (i.e., m = (1, 0)) at price p1 ∈ {p1, p2}
generate an expected profit π (p1) ≤ πm. Those who would have a match only in their
second inspection (i.e., m = (0, 1)) at price p2 ∈ {p1, p2} generate an expected profit
π (p2) ≤ πm if product 2 is disclosed in the first inspection (i.e., δ = 2), otherwise (i.e.,
δ ∈ {0, 1}) they generate that expected profit only if they have a cost c < µ2sm. For
consumers that would have matches on both inspections (i.e., m = (1, 1)), the following
possible cases arise:
• If they expect to encounter product 2 on the second inspection and c > µ2sm:
E [Π|c, s, (1, 1) , δ] = π (p1) ≤ πm.
• Otherwise, letting (p1, p2) ∈ {{p1, p2} , {p2, p1}} denote the price encountered on
the first and second inspections, and letting µ2 denote consumers’updated beliefs
about the probability of a match with the remaining product:
— If p1 ≤ p2 or c > µ2 (p1 − pm), then consumers buy at p1 if v ≥ p1, and do not
buy otherwise; we thus have:





— If instead p1 > p2 and c < µ2 (p1 − pm), then consumers never buy at p1:
consumers with a match on the first slot and v ≥ p1 continue to search, and
thus end-up buying at p2. It follows that consumers who buy do so at p2; as
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consumers would not buy if their valuations lie below p2, we then have:





Hence, we have E [Π|c, s, (1, 1) , δ] ≤ πm.
To check that the deviation cannot be profitable, it suffi ces to note that:
• The deviation does not affect the number of active consumers and, from the above,
cannot increase the profit generated by consumers that would have matches on both
inspections, or a match on the first inspection only. As for consumers that would
have a match on the second inspection only:
— deviating on prices cannot increase the profit generated by those who make
that second inspection;
— deviating on disclosure cannot increase profit either: disclosing the identity
of product 1 would have no impact (consumers would anyway expect to find
product 2 in the next inspection), and not disclosing the identity of product 2
would reduce profit, by making consumers more pessimistic about the identity
of the other product, thus inducing consumers with cost c > µ2s
m to stop
searching.
We now turn to alternative candidate continuation equilibria. Consider first a can-
didate equilibrium in which δ2 < δ1 = 1. After a first, unsuccessful inspection, if the
identity of the product is undisclosed then consumers infer that they inspected product 2
and stop searching if their cost exceeds µ2s
m. But then, the firm would better not disclose
the identity of product 1, so as make consumers believe that they inspected product 2
and induce them to keep searching as long as their cost does not exceed µ1s
m > µ2s
m. A
similar argument applies to to candidate equilibria in which δ1 = δ2 = 1. By deviating
and not disclosing the identity of product 1, consumers’passive beliefs would lead them
to become more optimistic and keep searching more often. Specifically, consumers who
inspect product 1 first would then expect the remaining product to deliver a match with
higher probability (namely, (µ1 + µ2) /2 > µ2), which in turn raises the cost threshold
under which they keep searching in the absence of a match.
Consider now a candidate equilibrium such that δ1 = δ2 = 0. As product identities
are never disclosed, consumers’behavior is then the same as in our baseline setting. In
particular, consumers who start searching keep searching. It follows that, indeed, the
firm does not have an incentive to deviate and disclose the identity of the products: by
construction, this cannot affect consumers’decision about whether to start searching,
and may only induce some of them to stop searching in the absence of a first match.
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Finally, consider a candidate equilibrium such that δ1 = 0 < δ2 < 1. It must be the
case that all active consumers keep searching in the absence of a match with the first
inspected product. Otherwise, the firm would have an incentive to disclose the identity
of product 2 with probability 1, so as to make consumers more optimistic. But then, any
such equilibrium induces the same consumer behavior as the “no disclosure”equilibrium
δ1 = δ2 = 0. Conversely, to induce consumers to keep searching, the probability of
disclosing product 2 should not be too large, so as to ensure that consumers remain
suffi ciently optimistic in the absence of disclosure. Specifically, in the absence of a match
on the first inspection the posterior belief, which we will denote by µ̂2 (δ2), should be
suffi ciently optimistic that marginal consumers (i.e., those with seach cost c = c2) are




(1− µ1)µ2 + 12 (1− δ2) (1− µ2)µ1
1
2
(1− µ1) + 12 (1− µ2) (1− δ2)
=
µ1 + µ2 − 2µ1µ2 − µ1 (1− µ2) δ2
1− µ1 + (1− µ2) (1− δ2)
,
which is decreasing in δ2:
d
dδ2
= − (1− µ1) (1− µ2) (µ1 − µ2)
(1− µ1 + (1− µ2) (1− δ2))
2 < 0.
Hence, as δ2 increases, µ̂2 (δ2) decreases from
µ̂2 (0) =
µ1 + µ2 − 2µ1µ2
2− µ2 − µ1
to µ̂2 (1) = µ2. From Proposition 1, we know that c2 < µ̂2 (0) s
m, as consumers who











(µ1 − µ2) (2− µ2)
4− µ2 − µ1
> 0.
It follows that there exists δ̂2 ∈ (0, 1) such that, as long as δ2 < δ̂2, consumers who start
searching keep searching in the absence of a match.
J Proof of Proposition 11
Establishing existence is straightforward given our earlier results; we therefore provide
only a brief sketch of the proof here. First, consumers have no incentive to deviate. In
the equilibria in which the firm uniformly randomizes over the slot allocation, consumers
are indifferent as to which slot to inspect first. Moreover, in the equilibria described in
part 1 of the proposition, the probability of disclosure of product 2 is “suffi ciently small”
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that– in the absence of disclosure and of a match on the first inspection– each consumer
still puts a high enough probability on the event that the inspected product in slot 1 is
the less popular product, which ensures that he is willing to inspect slot 2.40 The firm has
no incentive to deviate either. As before, a deviation on the slot allocation would not be
observed by consumers and thus would have no effect on consumer participation. In part
1 of the proposition, active consumers keep searching until finding a match; hence, the
firm cannot improve upon the outcome by changing the slot allocation or the disclosure
policy. In part 2, active consumers randomize over which slot to visit first; hence, the firm
is indifferent as to which product to allocate to which slot. Moreover, the firm cannot
benefit by changing its disclosure policy: disclosing or not product 1 does not make a
difference to consumer behavior, and disclosing product 2 is strictly optimal as consumers
without a match upon the first inspection would otherwise stop searching.
We now show that there do not exist other equilibria. W.l.o.g., we confine attention
to r ≥ 1/2. Note first that any (monopoly-pricing) equilibrium must have the property
that there exists a cutoff type c ∈ (µ2sm, µ1sm] such that consumers with search costs
c < c inspect at least one slot whereas those with search costs c > c do not inspect any
slot. Consumers with search costs c < µ2s
m will continue searching until finding a match,
no matter what the disclosure policy (on or off the equilibrium path); the order of their
search depends only on the equilibrium value of r: If r > 1/2, all of these consumers
necessarily start by inspecting slot 1 first; if r = 1/2, they are indifferent.
Let δik the probability that the firm discloses the identity of product i when allocated
to slot k.
We start by noting that there cannot be an equilibrium with r = 1. In such an
equilibrium, all active consumers with search costs c > µ2s
m would stop searching after
inspecting slot 1. The firm could thus profitably deviate by setting r = 0 (i.e., allocating
product 2 to slot 1) and disclosing the identity of product 2: all consumers who do not
have a match with the product in slot 1 would then choose to inspect slot 2, knowing
that product 1 is allocated to that slot.
It follows that, in equilibrium, each product is allocated to both slots with positive
probability. Next, we claim that any equilibrium must have the following properties.
First, any slot j is inspected first by some consumers with search costs c > µ2s
m, then
either δ2j = 1, in which case consumers fully learn the identity of the product and
consumers with search costs c > µ2s
m stop searching in the absence of a match, or else
δ1j = 0 and δ2j is small enough(possibly zero) to ensure that all consumers continue
searching in the absence of a match. Second, if both slots are visited first by some
consumers with search costs c > µ2s
m, then either δ21 = δ22 = 1 or else δ11 = δ12 = 0 and
δ21 and δ22 are both suffi ciently small that consumers continue searching in the absence
40Recall that if the probability of disclosure is zero, then for any r < r any active consumer who does
not have a match with the product offered in slot 1 has a strict incentive to continue searching.
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of a match, regardless of which slot they inspected first.
To this end, suppose first that there exists a slot j that is inspected first by some of
the consumers with search costs c > µ2s
m and that, with positive probability, some of
those consumers stop searching in the absence of a match. Then, we must have δ2j = 1.
Suppose otherwise that δ2j < 1. If some of these consumers were to stop searching in
the absence of disclosure, then the firm could profitably deviate by increasing δ2j so as to
induce consumers who inspected product 2 to keep searching. Therefore, all consumers
must continue searching in the absence of disclosure. It is then optimal for the firm to
set δ1j = 0, so as to ensure that all these consumers keep searching. We thus have a
contradiction: no matter which product is allocated to slot j, all consumers continue
searching in the absence of a match.
Suppose now that there exists a slot j that is inspected first by some of the consumers
with search costs c > µ2s
m and that all these consumers continue searching in the absence
of a match. Then, δ1j = 0 as otherwise all consumers with search costs c > µ2 would stop
searching after product 1 is revealed to be in that slot; moreover, δ2j has to be suffi ciently
small so that all of those consumers without a match are still willing to continue searching
when nothing is disclosed.
Second, suppose that slots 1 and 2 are both visited first by some consumers with
search costs c > µ2s
m. If δ2j = 1 for j = 1 or j = 2, then δ21 = δ22 = 1. To see
this, suppose otherwise that δ2j = 1 but δ2k < 1. By the first property just established,
this means that in the absence of a match on the first inspection: (i) consumers with
search costs c > µ2s
m who visit slot j first stop searching whenever product 1 is allocated
to that slot; by contrast, those who visit slot k first all continue searching. But then
the firm could profitably deviate by allocating product 1 with probability 1 to slot k
without disclosing its identity, together with disclosing the identity of product 2 whenever
consumers inspect slot j. But this contradicts our earlier finding that there does not does
exist a pure positioning equilibrium (i.e., we cannot have r = 0 nor r = 1).
Note that this implies that if slots 1 and 2 are both visited first by some consumers
with search costs c > µ2s
m and δ21 = δ22 = 1, then we must have r = 1/2 as otherwise,
if r > 1/2, all active consumers would inspect slot 1 first.
Finally, note that this also implies that if δ2j = 1 for only one slot j (i.e., δ2k < 1), then
slot j must be the slot that is visited second by all consumers (i.e., given the convention
that r ≥ 1/2, it must be slot 2), and the disclosure policy in the slot that is visited
first (i.e., slot 1) is non-revealing, so that all active consumers continue searching in the
absence of a match.
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K Proof of Proposition 14
Suppose that the platform chose a size n ≥ 1 in stage 1. We show that, in the proper
continuation subgame that starts in stage 2, the following beliefs and strategies, in which
Ie (n, n̂) denotes an arbitrary set of sellers of size n̂ and Îi (I) denotes an arbitrary
constitute a PBE with passive beliefs:
• In stage 5, for any number n̂ of sellers present on the platform (“active sellers”
hereafter), consumers:
— expect the set of active sellers to be In if n̂ = n and Ie (n, n̂) if n̂ < n, and
expect all products to be offered at the monopoly price pm (regardless of the
prices they actually encounter);
— start searching if and only if their cost is lower than c (Ie (n, n̂)), where
c (I) ≡ M (I)
N (I) s
m,
where M (I) and N (I) are respectively given by (1) and (3) —in particular,
c (In) = cn—, in which case they keep searching until finding a match (again,
regardless of the prices they encounter);
— upon finding a match, stop searching if they the associated price does not
exceed the monopoly price, in which case they buy if their valuation exceeds
the associated price (if the associated price exceeds the monopoly price, they
keep searching if their search cost is low enough).
• In stage 4, for any set I of sellers approached in stage 2 and any number n̂ of active
sellers, each of these sellers:
— expects charges the monopoly price pm and expects the others to do the same.
• In stage 3, for any I:












denotes the probability that a consumer has his first match with product i ∈ I,
and P ik(I) denotes the set of subsets of I that are of size k ≤ n and do not
include product i;
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— each seller i ∈ I expects all other sellers in I\ {i} to join the platform, is
willing to pay up to φ̂i (I) for joining the platform, and accepts the platform’s
offer.
• In stage 2, the plaftorm approaches the sellers of the n most popular products:
I = In.
We start with the last stage. For any n̂ ≤ n, as consumers expect a uniform price
and have passive beliefs, after k unsuccesful inspections their updated match probability
is given by αk (Ie (n, n̂)), which, from Lemma 1 increases with k; hence, if they found it
desirable to start searching, they are willing to keep searching —see the proof of Propo-
sition 1. Upon finding a match, however, they stop searching if the associated price does
not exceed the monopoly price, as they do not expect to find a better price; by contrast,
if the associated price exceeds the monopoly price, the prospect of finding a lower price
induces consumers with low enough search costs to inspect additional products. Hence,
consumers who start searching expect to find a match with probability M (Ie (n, n̂))
and anticipate an expected number of inspections given by N (Ie (n, n̂)); it follows that
consumers are willing to start searching if and only if c ≤ c (Ie (n, n̂)).
Moving to stage 4, it is straightforward to check that, for any I and any n̂ ≤ n, no
active seller has an incentive to deviate and charge p 6= pm: this would have no impact
on the number of visits (active consumers visit the seller if and only if they do not have
a prior match with another seller, regardless of the price actually charged by the seller)
and would strictly decrease the expected profit per visit: as a consumer would not buy
if there is no match or his valuation is lower than p, this expected profit per visit cannot
exceed µip [1− F (p)] = µiπ (p) < µiπ (pm) (in addition, raising the price above pm may
induce some consumers with v > p to inspect additional products and eventually buy
from another seller).
We now turn to stage 3. As seller i ∈ I expects all other sellers in I to join the
platform, if it also join the platform it expects consumers to observe n̂ = n and thus to
become active if their search costs lies below c (In) = cn; hence, its expected profit from
joining the platform is given by φ̂i (I) = G (cn) α̂i (I) πm, and it is thus willing to pay up
to φ̂i (I); conversely, as acceptance decisions are private, the platform finds it profitable
to make an acceptable offer to every seller i ∈ I, and the most profitable of these offers
is precisely given by φ̂i (I).
Finally, consider stage 2. Given the above continuation strategies, approaching a set
I of sellers gives the platform an expected profit equal to obtains∑
i∈I
φ̂i (I) = G (cn)
∑
i∈I
αi (I) πm = G (cn)M (I) πm.
The conclusion then follows from the fact that M (I) is maximal for I = In.
63
Online Appendix for
Consumer Search and Choice Overload
A On the Multiplicity of Equilibria with Passive Be-
liefs
In this section, we construct an equilibrium for the case where n = 2 in which the firm
offers its products at different prices. For simplicity, we assume that all consumers who
start searching face the same search cost, c. All other assumptions are as in the baseline
setting of Section 2.
A.1 Candidate Equilibrium
We consider a candidate equilibrium in which the firm offers products 1 at the monopoly
price (p∗1 = p
m) and product 2 at a moderately lower price (p∗2 < p
m), in such a way that





2 ≡ s (p∗2).
In what follows, we fix (F (·), µ1, and) the equilibrium price p∗2, and characterize the









We further focus on an equilibrium with passive beliefs in which consumers make a first
inspection, and then inspect the remaining product only if they observe p∗2 and have no










2 + (1− µ2) (µ1sm − c)]
⇐⇒ c < c̄ (µ2) ≡
(2− µ2)µ1sm + µ2s∗2
3− µ2
. (14)
For the second inspection decision we must have:
• In the absence of a match at the first inspection, upon observing an unexpected
price p /∈ {pm, p∗2}, consumers stop searching:
c > ĉ (µ2) ≡
(1− µ2)µ1sm + (1− µ1)µ2s∗2
2− µ1 − µ2
. (15)
1





Altogether, the above conditions yield:
µ2s
m < ĉ (µ2) < c̄ (µ2) < µ1s
m.
It follows that consumers stop searching if they observe p = pm (as µ1s
m >




2 < (ĉ (µ2) <) c).
• After a first match, consumers stop searching. This is obviously the case if they
observed p = p∗2 < p
m; if instead they observed p /∈ {pm, p∗2}, this holds if they stop








and is implied by (15).2 Finally, if they observed p = pm, this requires:
c > c̃ (µ2) ≡ µ2 (pm − p∗2) .
It follows that all the above conditions are satisfied if µ2 < µ̄2 and c ∈ (c (µ2) , c̄ (µ2)),
where:
c (µ2) ≡ max {c̃ (µ2) , ĉ (µ2)} .
As µ2 goes to zero, c (µ2) tends to ĉ (0) = µ1s
m/ (2− µ1), whereas c̄ (µ2) tends to 2µ1sm/3,
which exceeds ĉ (0) for µ1 < 1/2; hence, for any given µ1 < 1/2, there exists a non-empty
search cost range for µ2 small enough.
A.2 Possible Deviations









2 + (1− µ2)µ1πm]
=




c̄ (µ2)− ĉ (µ2) =
1− 2µ1 + µ1µ2
(3− µ2) (2− µ1 − µ2)
(µ1s
m − µ2s∗2) > 0,









(µ1 − µ2) (µ1sm − µ2s∗2)
(2− µ1 − µ2) (µ1 + µ2)
> 0.
2
where π∗2 ≡ π (p∗2). As µ2 goes to zero, this expected profit tends to
Π∗0 ≡ µ1πm.
We can distinguish three types of deviation, depending on which prices are affected.
A.2.1 Single deviation on p1
A single deviation on the price of the product 1 from pm to p1 /∈ {pm, p2} does not affect
consumers’ search behavior: they stop searching after the first inspection unless they
encountered p2 and had no match, as along the equilibrium path. It follows that such
deviation cannot be profitable, as it simply replaces the monopoly profit πm with a lower
profit π (p1) < πm in case of a match with the product 1.
A single deviation from p1 = pm to p1 = p∗2 induces instead consumers to keep










2 + (1− µ2)µ1π∗2]
= [µ1 + µ2 − µ1µ2] π∗2.
We have:


















2 + (1− µ2)µ1π∗2]
=
(2− µ2)µ1 (πm − π∗2)− (1− µ1)µ2π∗2
2
.
This deviation is therefore unprofitable as long as:
(2− µ2)µ1 (πm − π∗2) > (1− µ1)µ2π∗2. (16)
As µ2 goes to zero, the left-hand tends to 2µ1 (π
m − π∗2) > 0 whereas the right-hand side
tends to 0. Hence, there exists µ̂2 such that this deviation is unprofitable as long as
µ2 < µ̂2.
A.2.2 Other deviations
Deviating on the price of the second product —in isolation or combined with deviating
on the price of the first product —induces all consumers to stop searching after the first
inspection, regardless of whether there is a match; hence, a deviation to (p̃1, p̃2) (where
p̃1 = p
m in case of an isolated deviation on p2, and p̃1 6= pm in case of a simultaneous
3







Using π (p̃i) ≤ πm and π∗2 ≥ 0, we have:


















It follows that this deviation is unprofitable whenever





For any µ1 ∈ (0, 1/2) and any p∗2 < pm, the above strategies constitute an equilibrium for
any µ2 ∈ (0,min {µ̄2, µ̂2, µ̃2}) and any c ∈ (c (µ2) , c̄ (µ2)).
Illustration: Suppose that match valuations are uniformly distributed over [0, 1]; we
have:















Fix p∗2 = p































Condition (16) amounts to:




















where µ̂2 also exceeds µ̄2:












(1− µ2)µ1sm + (1− µ1)µ2s∗2








4µ1 + 9µ2 − 13µ1µ2
32 (2− µ1 − µ2)
,
c̃ (µ2) = [µ2 (p




















8µ1 + 9µ2 − 4µ1µ2
32 (3− µ2)
As expected, c̄ (µ2) > ĉ (µ2):
8µ1 + 9µ2 − 4µ1µ2
32 (3− µ2)
− 4µ1 + 9µ2 − 13µ1µ2
32 (2− µ1 − µ2)
=
(4µ1 − 9µ2) (1− 2µ1 + µ1µ2)
32 (2− µ1 − µ2) (3− µ2)
,
where the right-hand side is positive for µ1 ∈ (0, 1/2) and µ2 ∈ (0, 4µ1/9). In addition,
c̄ (µ2) > c̃ (µ2) as long as:
0 >





8µ1 − 15µ2 + 8µ22 − 4µ1µ2
32 (3− µ2)
⇔ µ2 < µ̌2 ≡
15 + 4µ1 −
√
225− 136µ1 + 16µ21
16
where the threshold µ̌2 exceeds µ̄2:
µ̌2 − µ̄2 =
15 + 4µ1 −
√

































225− 136µ1 + 16µ21
> 0,
where the inequality stems from the fact that the numerator and the denominator of the
last expression are both positive for any µ1 ∈ (0, 1).
It follows that, for p∗2 = 1/4, there exists an equilibrium such as described above
for any µ1 ∈ (0, 1/2], any µ2 ∈ (0, 4µ1/9) and any c ∈ (c (µ2) , c̄ (µ2)), where c (µ2) =
5
max {c̃ (µ2) , ĉ (µ2)}.
A.4 Profitability
The above equilibrium can be more profitable than the monopoly price equilibrium, by
encouraging more consumers to search. The upper bound on the search cost, given by











c̄ (µ2)− c2 =
(2− µ2)µ1sm + µ2s∗2
3− µ2







(2− µ2)µ1 + µ2
3− µ2










4− µ1 − µ2
sm
> 0.
It follows that, in the above illustration, for any c ∈ (max {c (µ2) , c2} , c̄ (µ2)):
• the monopoly pricing equilibrium would generate no search, and therefore yield zero
profit.3
• by contrast, the above equilibrium induces all consumers to search, and yields a
positive profit.
B Properties of the Average Inframarginal Cost
We show here that the average cost of inframarginal consumers, ce(c), is proportional to
the cost of the marginal consumer, c, if and only if G (c) = (c/c̄)α for some α > 0. Using









cG (c)− Γ (c)
cG (c)
= 1− Γ (c)
cG (c)
,
3Although the firm is there indifferent about the product portfolio and its prices, introducing an
infinitesimal number of consumers with low enough search costs would not materially affect the analysis
but would eliminate this indifference.
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where Γ (c) =
∫ c
0
G(x)dx denotes the primitive of G (c). For ce(c) to be proportional to
c, the ratio ce(c)/c must remain constant; the above equality therefore implies that the







Solving this differential equation yields:
log Γ (c) = (1 + a) log c+ log b,
for some constant b, or:
Γ (c) = bc1+α
and thus:
G (c) = Γ′ (c) = (1 + α) bcα.
The function G (c) must be increasing in c, which requires α > 0, and it must be equal
to 1 for c = c̄, which determines the constant b, and leads to G (c) = (c/c̄)α.
C Proof of Lemma 4
Fix µ1 ∈ (0, 1) and denote by η the percentage reduction in the probability of a match
for the second product; that is:
η ≡ µ1 − µ2
µ1
⇐⇒ µ2 = (1− η)µ1.
The profit achieved with n products is given by
Πn = G (cn)M (In)πm.
Therefore:
• for n = 1, we have M1 = µ1, N1 = 1, c1 = µ1sm, and thus
Π1 = G (µ1s
m)µ1π
m.
• for n = 2, we have:
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M2 = 1− (1− µ1) (1− µ2) = (2− µ1 − (1− µ1) η)µ1,
N2 = 1 +
(1− µ1) + (1− µ2)
2
































(2− µ1 − (1− µ1) η)µ1πm.
Hence, n = 2 dominates n = 1 (i.e., Π2 > Π1) if and only if:











(2− µ1 − (1− µ1) η)−G (µ1sm) > 0.
The function φ (η;µ1) satisfies:
φ (0;µ1) = (1− µ1)G (µ1sm) > 0,















−G (µ1sm) < 0,
where the first inequality stems from µ1 ∈ (0, 1) and the last inequality follows from
2/ (4− µ1) < 2/3 < 1 for µ1 ∈ (0, 1). The function φ (η;µ1) is moreover decreasing in η

















(4− 2µ1 + ηµ1)













It follows that, for any µ1 ∈ (0, 1), there exists a unique η̂ (µ1) such that φ (η̂ (µ1) ;µ1);
it is then strictly better to offer two products rather than one if η < η̂ (µ1), and strictly
better to offer one product rather than two if η > η̂ (µ1). The continuity of the density
g(·) ensures that η̂(µ1) varies continuously with µ1. Furthermore:
• for µ1 = 1, we have:








implying that η̂ (1) = 0;
• for µ1 = 0, φ (·; 0) = 0; hence, as µ1 tends to 0, the first-order approximation of












It follows that, as µ1 tends to 0, η̂ (µ1) tends to the solution to:
(2− η)2
2




η̂ (µ1) = 2−
√
2 ' 0.585
D Profitability of Monopoly Pricing Equilibria
We consider here the case where positioning and/or disclosure are available, and provide a
comparison of the profits obtained by the firm in the various monopoly pricing equilibria
that may arise. As the random positioning equilibrium characterized by Proposition 7 is
a particular case of a noisy positioning equilibrium, we focus on the pure positioning equi-
librium characterized by Proposition 8, the best noisy equilibrium among those identified
by Proposition 9, and the disclosure equilibrium (with either no or random positioning)
characterized by Propositions 10 and 11. The pure positioning equilibrium generates an
expected profit equal to
ΠP ≡ G (c1)µ1πm +G (c2) (1− µ1)µ2πm,
where
c1 = µ1s
m and c2 ≡ µ2sm.















µ1 + µ2 + (1− µ2)µ1
3− µ2
sm ∈ (c2, c1) .
4We focus here on the relevant solution: the other solution is equal to
√
2 + 2 and thus exceeds 1.
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Finally, the best noisy positioning equilibrium generates a profit equal to







M2 = µ1 + µ2 − µ1µ2,





is the cost of the marginal searcher, where
µ1 (r̄) = r̄µ1 + (1− r̄)µ2
denotes the expected probability of a match on the first position.
As r = r̄ is such that a consumer with search cost cN2 (r̄) is not only indifferent between
participating or not, but also between inspecting or not the second position if the first




m = µ1 (r̄) sm,
leading to:
cN2 (r̄) = (µ





(2− µ2) c1 + c2
3− µ2
can be expressed as a weighted average of c1 and c2, with positive weights on both
thresholds. The same applies to cN2 (r̄) = µ














The last inequality implies that the pure positioning equilibrium generates the greatest
participation. Among the other two equilibria, either one can generate greater participa-
tion:
Lemma D.1 We have:
cN2 (r̄) ≷ cD2 ⇐⇒ µ1 ≷ φ (µ2) ≡
3− 3µ2 + µ22
(2− µ2)
2 ,













1−M2 > 3− µ2 − [(µ1 + µ2 + (1− µ2)µ1)] = 3 + µ1µ2 − 2µ2 − 2µ1 (> 0)
⇐⇒ (3− µ2)
2 (1− µ1 − µ2 + µ2µ1) > (3 + µ1µ2 − 2µ2 − 2µ1)
2
⇐⇒ (µ1 − µ2)
(




3− 3µ2 + µ22
(2− µ2)
2 = φ (µ2) .
Conversely, cD2 < c
N
2 (r̄) if and only µ1 > φ (µ2).
Building on this, the next proposition shows that any of the three types of equilibria
can be the most profitable:
Proposition D.1 (most profitable equilibrium) Suppose that positioning and/or dis-
closure are available, that only two products are available, and consider the pure position-
ing equilibrium characterized by Proposition 8, the best noisy equilibrium among those
identified by Proposition 9, and the disclosure equilibrium (with either no or random po-
sitioning) characterized by Propositions 10 and 11. For each of these equilibria, there
exist match probabilities, µ1 and µ2, and distributions of search costs, G (s), such that
this equilibrium is the most profitable one.
Proof. Recall that the pure positioning equilibrium is more profitable when the firm
offers both products than when it offers a single product, and that in the latter case,
positioning and disclosure plays no role. Hence, without loss of generality, we can focus
on the case where the firm offers both products.
We first note that pure positioning is the most profitable equilibrium when µ2 is small
enough, as it generates the greatest participation; indeed, in the limit case where µ2 tends
to vanish, we have:
lim
µ2→0





















By contrast, for any given probabilities µ1 and µ2, the noisy positioning equilibrium
is the most profitable one if there are few consumers with search costs between c ≡
min
{




and c1; indeed, in the limit case where no consumer has a search cost








= G (c1) yields:




Hence, ΠR > ΠD > ΠP whenever some consumers have a search cost between c2 and c
(so that G (c1) > G (c2)).
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Finally, for any given probabilities µ2 and µ1 < φ (µ2), implying c
N
2 (r̄) < c
D
2 , the
disclosure equilibrium is the most profitable one if there are few consumers with search
costs between cD2 and c1, as well as between c2 and c
N
2 (r̄); indeed, in the limit case where














ΠP − ΠR = [G (c1)−G (c2)]µ1πm.
Hence, ΠD > ΠP > ΠR whenever some consumers have a search cost between cN2 (r̄) and
cD2 (so that G (c1) > G (c2)).
E Consumer Surplus under Positioning and Disclo-
sure
E.1 Proof of Proposition 12
We compare here the consumer surplus generated by the noisy positioning equilibria
identified by Propositions 7, 9 and 11, the pure positioning equilibrium identified by
Proposition 8, and the disclosure equilibria identified by Propositions 10 and 11.
• SN (r) increases with r. We first show that, among the random (r = 1/2) and noisy
positioning (1/2 < r ≤ r̄) equilibria, consumers prefer the least noisy one (r = r̄). The
noisy positioning equilibrium associated with a given r ∈ [1/2, 1] gives a consumer with
search cost c an expected surplus equal to
ŜN (c; r) ≡
M2sm −NN2 (r) c if c ≤ cN2 (r),0 otherwise, (17)
where M2 = µ1 + µ2 − µ1µ2 and
NN2 (r) = 2− [rµ1 + (1− r)µ2] . (18)
As NN2 (r) is decreasing in r, and Ŝ




ŜN (c; r) dG (c) increases with r.
• SP > max
{
SN (r̄) , SD
}
. Next, we show that the pure positioning equilibrium
yields higher consumer surplus than any noisy positioning and disclosure equilibrium.
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Pure positioning gives a consumer with search cost c an expected surplus given by
ŜP (c) ≡

0 if c ≥ µ1sm
ŜP1 (c) ≡ µ1sm − c if µ1sm ≥ c ≥ µ2sm,
ŜP2 (c) ≡ ŜP1 (c) + (1− µ1) (µ2sm − c) if c ≤ µ2sm.
Eliminating the noise in positioning enhances consumer surplus: for any r ≤ r̄ < 1,
ŜP (c)−ŜN (c; r) =

µ1s
m − c > 0 if µ1sm > c ≥ cN2 (r),
(1− r) (µ1 − µ2) c− (1− µ1) (µ2sm − c) > 0 if cN2 (r) ≥ c ≥ µ2sm,
(1− r) (µ1 − µ2) c if c ≤ µ2sm.
It readily follows that SP =
∫ +∞
0
ŜP (c)dG (c) > SN (r) for any r ≤ r̄.
The disclosure equilibrium gives a consumer with search cost c an expected surplus,











m − c) + 1
2
[µ2s





m − c) + 1
2
(1− µ2) (µ1sm − c)
< µ1s
m − c
= ŜP1 (c) ,
where the first inequality stems from c > µ2s
m and the second one from µ2 > 0 and
cD2 < µ1s
m. Hence, SP > SD =
∫ +∞
0
ŜD (c) dG (c).
E.2 Proof of Proposition 13
The least noisy positioning equilibrium corresponds to r = r̄, which, from the proof of








The search cost of the marginal consumer is then equal to:
cN2 ≡ cN2 (r̄) =
µ1 + µ2 − µ1µ2

















Any consumer with search cost c < cN2 obtains a positive expected surplus, which can be
expressed as


































































































where the second equality follows from M2sm − N2c = MD2 sm − ND2 c for c = µ2sm and
the last one stems from integration by parts.
Consumers with search cost c < µ2s
m keep searching until finding a match; they thus
favor positioning (even if noisy), which reduces their expected number of inspections by





Conversely, consumers with search cost c > µ2s
m may favor disclosure, which allows them
to avoid inspecting product 2. However, as MD2 < M2, this happens only if:
• Disclosure allows them to reduce their own expected number of searches: ND2 < NN2 ;
otherwise, ŜD (c) = MD2 s
m −ND2 c is obviously lower than Ŝ (c; r̄) = M2sm −NN2 c.
• It does so to an extent suffi cient to offset the reduced probability of a match (from
M2 to MD2 ); this is the case if and only if disclosure expands the number of active
14
consumers:5 cD2 > c
N





3− 3µ2 + µ22
(2− µ2)
2 .
It follows that, if µ1 > µ
N
1 (µ2), then all consumers prefer noisy positioning to
disclosure.
Conversely, suppose now that µ1 = µ2 + ε, where ε is positive but small. We have:







































NN2 (ε) = 1 +
√
(1− µ2 − ε) (1− µ2)
















5For consumers with search cost c > µ2s









, where ND2 < N
N






ŜN (c, r̄); conversely, if cD2 > c
N







surplus with disclosure, and no surplus with noisy positioning.
6See Lemma D.1 in Online appendix D.
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Therefore




















































































µ2 + µ2 + ε
2


































































































































It follows that, for ε small enough and µ1 < µ2 + ε, disclosure yields greater consumer
surplus:















































where the inequality stems from Γ′ (·) = G (·) and Γ′′ (·) > 0, which impliesG (µ2sm)µ2sm >
Γ (µ2s
m).7
We now turn to the second part of Proposition 13. The expected consumer surplus













































, if the distribution of














m and MD2 s
m = ND2 c
D








m)−G (c) dc > 0.
8Recall that this corresponds to power distributions of the form G (c) = (c/c̄)α over [0, c̄], for some
α > 0.
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where Π̄D = M2πmG (µ2s









is the equilibrium expected
profit. It follows that, among the least noisy positioning and disclosure equilibria, the
profit-maximizing one also maximizes consumer surplus.
To show that a bias can arise with alternative distributions of search costs, suppose
that µ1 < µ
N
1 (µ2) (otherwise, as already noted, disclosure is unattractive for the firm
and all consumers), and consider the following examples:9
• Example 1: consumers have the same search cost ĉ, which is slightly below cN2 ; we
then have
Π̄N = M2π










> S̄N ' 0.
• Example 2: a mass 1 − m of consumers have the same search cost ĉ, which is
slightly below µ2s
m, whereas the remaining mass m ∈ (0, 1) of consumers have a search
cost slightly below cD2 ; we then have






































9For simplicity, these examples assume that consumers’search costs take at most two values; intro-
ducing an infinitesimal mass of costs distributed over [0,+∞) would not affect the insights.
10The approximation stems from ĉ being slightly below cN2 .
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where, as M2 > MD2 , the right-hand side is positive whenever m > 1− cN2 /cD2 .
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